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COMMENTS
CERCLA Retroactive Liability in the
Aftermath of Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel
KAREN S. DANAHYt
"Retroactive law. [Laws] which take away or impair vested rights
acquired under existing laws, create new obligations, impose a
new duty, or attach a new disability in respect to the transactions
or considerations already past."'
INTRODUCTION
A coal operator made all of the required contributions to a mul-
tiemployer pension plan during its years of operations in the indus-
try. The operator subsequently exited the coal industry when it
transferred its coal business to a subsidiary. Almost 30 years after
it departed the coal industry, a newly enacted law would render it
liable for potentially $100 million in health benefits for retired
miners.
t J.D., May 2000, State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law. My
thanks to Professors Barry Boyer, Ph.D., Janet Lindgren, and Lee Albert for
their valuable comments and advice, Professor James Wooten for guidance on
an earlier draft, and Adam S. Walters, Esq., Phillips Lytle Hitchcock Blaine &
Huber LLP, for generously taking the time to share his thoughtful insight. My
deepest appreciation to Timothy Danahy for his endless support and encour-
agement
1. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1317 (6th ed. 1990).
2. See Brief for Petitioner at 1-2, 6, Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498
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A small family business owner sought to construct a new plant to
accommodate his growing enterprise. He purchased commercially
zoned property, formerly owned by a steel corporation, and built a
new concrete producing facility. He proceeded to run a successful
operation-unaware of the hazardous wastes that accompanied the
deed to the property. Subsequently, the detection of hazardous con-
taminants would require the owner to pay thousands of dollars in
cleanup costs under a law that did not even exist when the property
was purchased-or at the time the wastes were disposed.3
Both of these simplistic paradigms demonstrate the ret-
roactive liability effects associated with two different pieces
of economic legislation, the Coal Industry Retiree Health
Benefit Act of 1992 (Coal Act)4 and the Comprehensive En-
vironmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA).5 The first scenario depicts, in part, a recently
decided Supreme Court case, Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel,'
which is central to this discussion. Eastern Enterprises
(Eastern), a coal operator, claimed that the Coal Act was
unconstitutional because of the retroactive liability the law
imposed. Eastern argued that the Act violated its substan-
tive due process rights, and comprised an unconstitutional
taking of its property. Based upon the extensive line of
earlier cases that unsuccessfully challenged the Coal Act's
constitutionality, many believed Eastern's challenge would
suffer a similar fate. Specifically, an extensive line of prior
cases, including the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, and
Seventh Circuits, and more than thirty federal judges, had
previously upheld the retroactive legislation of the Coal Act
against the same constitutional challenges Eastern argued.8
(1998) (No. 97-42).
3. Interview with Paul A. Schmidt, former CEO, Clarence Materials Corpo-
ration, in Buffalo, N.Y. (Nov. 4, 1999).
4. 26 U.S.C. §§ 9701-22 (1994 & Supp. II 1998).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1996).
6. 524 U.S. 498.
7. See id. at 499.
8. See, e.g., Association of Bituminous Contractors, Inc. v. Apfel, 156 F.3d
1246 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Carbon Fuel Co. v. USX Corp., 100 F.3d 1124 (4th Cir.
1996); In re Chateaugay Corp., 53 F.3d 478 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., LTV
Steel Co. v. Shalala, 516 U.S. 913 (1995); Holland v. High-Tech Collieries, Inc.,
911 F. Supp. 1021 (N.D. W.Va. 1996); Lindsey Coal Mining Liquidating Trust v.
Shalala, 901 F. Supp. 959 (W.D. Pa. 1995), affd sub nom., 90 F.3d 688 (3d Cir.
1996); Templeton Coal Co. v. Shalala, 882 F. Supp. 799 (S.D. Ind. 1995), affd
sub nom., Davon, Inc. v. Shalala, 75 F.3d 1114 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S.
808 (1996); Unity Real Estate Co. v. Hudson, 889 F. Supp. 818 (W.D. Pa. 1995);
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Further, the Supreme Court denied certiorari three times to
Fifth Amendment constitutional challenges to the Coal Act,9
reinforcing the lower courts' determinations that the Act's
retroactive legislation is acceptable. Surprisingly, in East-
ern Enterprises, the Court shifted its direction on this issue
and invalidated the Coal Act as it applied to Eastern, find-
ing that the federal statute was unconstitutionally retroac-
tive because it placed a "disproportionate, and severely ret-
roactive burden" on this former coal operator.0
The second scenario depicts a CERCLA situation. In-
deed, when one takes stock of laws imposing retroactive li-
ability, CERCLA has been described as "the harshest li-
ability scheme around."" CERCLA imposes liability without
fault for acts that were legal at the time they occurred, a
most controversial liability scheme that has been consis-
tently upheld in the courts. 2 It is expected that challengers
of CERCLA's harsh retroactive liability will look to the
Eastern Enterprises decision to undermine the formidable
retroactive effects of this statute. Indeed, it appears diffi-
cult to reconcile the perseverance of CERCLA's retroactive
liability subsequent to the Court's invalidation of the Coal
Act's retroactive liability effect on Eastern.
This Comment will discuss the Eastern Enterprises de-
cision and explore whether the Court's determination will
render new support for challenges to the retroactive legisla-
tion promulgated in CERCLA. Part I of this Comment ex-
amines the Supreme Court's decision in Eastern Enterprises
v. Apfel, including the procedural history and the opinions
of the case. Part II looks at the Fifth Amendment constitu-
tional challenges Eastern posed to the Coal Act. Despite the
plurality's conclusion that the Coal Act violated the Fifth
Amendment in this case, only four justices agreed that the
In re Blue Diamond Coal Co., 174 B.R. 722 (E.D. Tenn. 1994), affd, 79 F.3d 516
(6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied sub nom., Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Chater, 519
U.S. 1055 (1997); Barrick Gold Exploration, Inc. v. Hudson, 823 F. Supp. 1395
(S.D. Ohio 1993), affd, 47 F.3d 832 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 813 (1995).
9. See In re Chateaugay Corp., 53 F.3d 478 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.,
LTV Steel Co. v. Shalala, 516 U.S. 913 (1995); Templeton Coal Co. v. Shalala,
882 F. Supp. 799 (S.D. Ind. 1995), affd sub nom., Davon, Inc. v. Shalala, 75
F.3d 1114 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 808 (1996); In re Blue Diamond Coal
Co., 174 B.R. 722 (E.D. Tenn. 1994), affd, 79 F.3d 516 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. de-
nied sub nom., Blue Diamond Coal Co. v. Chater, 519 U.S. 1055 (1997).
10. Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. at 536.
11. Ruth Simon, Deals That Smell Bad, FORBES, May 15, 1989, at 49.
12. See infra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
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Act constituted a taking in violation of the Takings
Clause."3 A due process analysis was deemed the appropri-
ate mechanism for this constitutional question by five jus-
tices. 4 Arguably, the fractured nature of this decision un-
dermines its precedential weight. Part III provides a
general discussion of retroactive legislation, including its
innate disfavor in society and its existence in various stat-
utes. This Part reviews the history of the judiciary's inter-
pretation of retroactive liability under CERCLA. Part IV
draws a comparison between the retroactive liability under
the Coal Act and CERCLA to assess the vulnerability of
CERCLA based on a similar challenge. Although the impo-
sition of retroactive liability under CERCLA is compara-
tively more harsh with its strict, joint and several liability
scheme, the Coal Act contains notable mitigating compo-
nents and the industries targeted by each Act are signifi-
cantly different. Part V looks at the application and impact
of the decision rendered in Eastern Enterprises to subse-
quent constitutional challenges. These challenges involve
both the Coal Act and CERCLA retroactive legislation in
the testing of Eastern Enterprises' precedential value. Fi-
nally, Part VI delves into CERCLA's journey through the
judicial, administrative, and legislative channels of our le-
gal system since its enactment, to demonstrate its evolve-
ment into a more reasonable and fairer law today. This Part
also takes note of accomplishments under CERCLA to date.
This Comment concludes that the Eastern Enterprises
decision provides little force for a similar CERCLA chal-
lenge despite CERCLA's inherently more severe retroactive
liability scheme. 5 The actual and projected tenacity of
13. The U.S. Constitution's Fifth Amendment Takings Clause provides:
"[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensa-
tion." U.S. CONST. amend. V. See Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. at 503-38
(O'Connor, J., plurality opinion, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Scalia, J., and Tho-
mas, J.); see id. at 539-50 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dis-
senting in part).
14. The Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that no person
shall be "deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law .... "
U.S. CONST. amend. V. See Eastern Enters.u. Apfel, 524 U.S. at 539-50 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part); id. at 553-68
(Breyer, J., with whom Stevens, Souter, and Ginsberg, J.J., join, dissenting).
15. Importantly, the "degree" of a statute's retroactive effect has been recog-
nized as "a significant determinant in the constitutionality of a statute." East-
ern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. at 549 (citing United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S.
26, 32 (1994)). See generally United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292 (1981);
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CERCLA's retroactive liability subsequent to the Eastern
Enterprises decision is attributable to the Court's frag-
mented decision necessitating a narrow reading of this case,
and the longstanding resistance of our legal and political
systems to overturn CERCLA's retroactive liability. Be-
cause the Eastern Enterprises decision is specific to the
claimant, no bright-line rule regarding the constitutionality
of laws imposing retroactive liability emerges from this de-
cision. However, despite the persistence of CERCLA's ret-
roactive liability scheme, this Comment will demonstrate
that an evolvement of a more fair application of the law's li-
ability has transpired since its enactment through the tri-
partite dynamics of judicial, administrative, and legislative
law. Finding decades ago that changes in accident law can
and do occur in response to a need for economic efficiencies,
Judge Guido Calabresi acknowledged that there remains
ingrained in society the belief that "justice require[s] a one-
to-one relationship between the party that injures and the
party that is injured." Today in CERCLA law there is still
a lack of nexus in many instances between the liable party
and the harm realized, but there has been measured prog-
ress towards utilizing this link to fairly assign liability.
I. EASTERN ENTERPRISES V. APFEL
A. The Coal Act
In 1992, Congress passed the Coal Act,' an extremely
contentious piece of legislation intended "to provide for the
continuation of a privately financed self-sufficient program
for the delivery of health care benefits to the beneficiaries of
[these health care benefit] plans." 8 Congress was called
upon by the Secretary of Labor's Coal Commission to statu-
torily impose an obligation on employers in the coal indus-
try to contribute to health care benefits for retired coal
Dunbar v. Boston & P.R. Corp., 63 N.E. 916, 917 (Mass. 1902)).
16. GUiDo CALABRESI, THE COSTS OFACCIDENTS 297 (1970).
17. 26 U.S.C. §§ 9701-22 (1994 & Supp. II 1998).
18. Id. § 9701. This statement of the Coal Act's policy follows § 9701 (quot-
ing Pub. L. No. 102-486 § 19142(a)(2)). For a more extensive background of this
legislation, see Brief of Respondent at 2-13, Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S.
498 (1998) (No. 97-42).
20001 513
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miners and their families. 9 Prior to the Coal Commission's
study, it was clear to the United Mine Workers of America
and the Bituminous Coal Operators Association that the
medical plans in place for retirees in this industry were in
serious financial straits.2" In fact, by 1990, the 1950 and
1974 Benefit Plans had realized a deficit of $110 million 1
The causes behind these financial difficulties included the
increase in the number of retirees in the coal industry, a
decline in both the production of coal and number of pro-
ducers, and a coinciding increase in national health care
costs.22 The industry agreed that remedial action was re-
quired, but there was disagreement about where financial
responsibility should lie. A formula was settled upon as-
signing eligible retirees to particular operators, "signato-
ries," based upon the retiree's employment history and the
Coal Act was established. The Coal Act's promulgation
was seen as a continuation of an extensive historical inter-
vention of the federal government in the coal industry.24
19. See Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. at 510-14.
20. See id. at 510-11.
21. See id.; see also id. at 511 (citing H.R. REP. No. 9 (1990)); CoAL CoMM'N
REP., No. 43-44, at 1373-74 (1990). The 1950 Benefit Plan covered miners re-
tired before January 1, 1976, and the 1974 Benefit Plan covered post 1975 retir-
ees. The Coal Act effectively merged these two Benefit Plans into a multiem-
ployer plan, the United Mine Workers of America Combined Benefit Fund. See
Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. at 514.
22. See Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. at 510.
23. See 26 U.S.C. § 9706(a) (1994 & Supp. II 1998); see also id. § 9701(c)(1)
(defining "signatory operator" as "a person which is or was a signatory to a coal
wage agreement"). Courts have endorsed this method of assignment:
[Bly. .. imposing... financing requirements on current and former [sig-
natory] coal operators, the Coal Act embodies four Congressional objec-
tives: (1) to make no attempt to rewrite the collective bargaining agree-
ments to penalize such conduct or to readjust the contractual rights and
liabilities of the parties to the [National Bituminous Coal Wage Agree-
ments]; (2) to effectuate a 'pay for your own' policy by 'assigning' compa-
nies financial responsibility for their own retirees in the [multiemployer
find]; (3) to implement Congress' decision that financing health care for
'orphaned' retirees should be shared by the employers who voluntarily
participated in the [United Mine Workers of America] multiemployer
health benefits system; and (4) to close loopholes through which compa-
nies ... have jumped to avoid their obligations to facilitate retiree health
care.
Mary Helen Coal Corp. v. Hudson, 976 F. Supp. 366, 369 (E.D. Va. 1997), rev'd,
164 F.3d 624 (4th Cir. 1998).
24. See In re Blue Diamond Coal Co., 79 F.3d 516, 518-19, 525 (6th Cir.
1996) (discussing the federal government's takeover of the nation's coal mines
in 1946 and its establishment of a United Mine Workers of America pension
2000] CERCLA RETROACTIVE LIABILITY
B. Procedural History
Under the Coal Act, the Commissioner of Social Secu-
rity (Commissioner) assigned health benefit payments for
more than 1,000 retired mine workers and their families to
Eastern, a Massachusetts business. The Coal Act, § 9706,
authorizes the Commissioner to "assign each coal industry
retiree who is an eligible beneficiary to a signatory operator
which... remains in business ... ,,5 Claiming an improper
assignment of these pension responsibilities, Eastern
sought a declaratory judgment to assign these beneficiaries
to a former subsidiary, Eastern Associated Coal Corpora-
tion (EACC).26 In this lawsuit against the Commissioner,
the pension fund, and its trustees, Eastern argued that it
transferred its coal mining operations to EACC in 1965, ef-
fectively terminating its involvement in this industry."
Further, EACC was Eastern's successor in the coal business
with responsibility for all of Eastern's corresponding liabili-
ties.28 Eastern also claimed the Coal Act violated its right to
substantive due process and constituted an unconstitu-
tional taking under the Fifth Amendment.29
In Eastern Enterprises v. Shalala,° the District Court
ruled against Eastern on these issues, upholding both the
Commissioner's assignment of beneficiary responsibility to
Eastern and the constitutionality of the Coal Act.3' The
court found that § 9607(a)(3) directs the Social Security
Administration to assign beneficiaries to a "signatory op-
erator which employed the coal industry retiree in the coal
industry for a longer period of time than any other signa-
tory operator prior to... the 1978 coal wage agreement."32
Although successor liability is not specifically addressed in
this section of the statute, the court concluded that Con-
gress did not intend to assign past liabilities to successor
operators. Further, this was a rational act by Congress be-
benefit and health fund, and federal intervention to settle strikes over benefit
issues).
25. 26 U.S.C. § 9706 (1994 & Supp. II 1998).
26. See Eastern Enters. v. Shalala, 942 F. Supp. 684 (D. Mass. 1996).
27. See Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. at 516.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. 942 F. Supp. at 684.
31. See id. at 686-88.
32. 26 U.S.C. § 9706(a)(3) (1994 & Supp. II 1998).
515
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cause the statute allows for a private civil action for pur-
suing pension benefit fund contributions from others.33 The
court stated that this unambiguous statute "does not ap-
pear.., to be unconstitutional."4 Eastern pursued these
challenges on appeal. 5
Consistent with the District Court, the First Circuit
found that the Social Security Administration's assignment
of beneficiaries to Eastern was proper. 6 Additionally, the
court maintained the constitutionality of the Coal Act." Af-
ter determining that "heightened judicial scrutiny" was not
required in evaluating this economic legislation, the court
concluded that the Coal Act does not violate Eastern's sub-
stantive due process rights." The First Circuit held that
Congress's means of enacting retroactive liability legisla-
tion were rationally related to the legitimate purpose of rec-
tifying multiemployer benefit plan funding problems. Spe-
cifically, Congress had concluded from evidence that pre-
1974 signatories to the coal wage agreements made an im-
plicit promise to provide lifetime health benefits to employ-
ees. 40 Thus, these operators should bear the responsibility
for health benefit payments. The court found that it was not
irrational to make Eastern responsible because Eastern had
"contributed directly to mine workers' legitimate expecta-
tions of lifetime health benefits" as a signatory of earlier
agreements. 41 In addition, the fact that the Coal Act im-
posed unanticipated liability on Eastern was not enough to
violate Eastern's due process rights. 2 The First Circuit
noted that courts have upheld legislation that "impose[s] a
new duty or liability based on past acts" finding that the
legislation "is not unlawful solely because it upsets other-
wise settled expectations."3
The First Circuit also rejected Eastern's claims that the
33. See id. § 9706(f)(3). This section authorizes a signatory operator to seek
indemnification from other parties.
34. Eastern Enters. v. Shalala, 942 F. Supp. at 688.
35. See Eastern Enters. v. Chater, 110 F.3d 150 (1st Cir. 1997).
36. See id. at 155.
37. See id. at 159-61.
38. Id. at 156.
39. See id. at 156-58.
40. See id. at 157.
41. Id.
42. See id.
43. Id. (quoting Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Construction Labor-
ers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 637 (1993)) (citations omitted).
[Vol. 48516
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Coal Act violated its equal protection rights and constituted
an unconstitutional taking under the Fifth Amendment."
The appellant argued that the Takings Clause,45 which pro-
hibits the confiscation of "private property.., for public
use, without just compensation,"46 applied to the moneys the
Coal Act mandated Eastern should pay into the multiem-
ployer plan. Assessing the statute against the three factors
adopted by the Supreme Court in Connolly v. Pension Bene-
fit Guaranty Corp.47 for determination of an unconstitu-
tional taking, the court held that the Coal Act imposed: (1)
a proportional economic impact; (2) a reasonable expecta-
tion of financial responsibility; and (3) payments of premi-
ums to a private benefit fund and not a government entity.4"
The Coal Act survived under the scrutiny of the Connolly
factors and did not constitute a violation of the Takings
Clause according to the First Circuit. Eastern once again
appealed and certiorari was granted.
C. Plurality Opinion
In Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, a divided Supreme
Court found Eastern's Takings Clause challenge persua-
sive. Four justices concluded that the Coal Act effected an
unconstitutional taking as it applied to Eastern, finding
that the Act "place[d] a severe, disproportionate, and ex-
tremely retroactive burden on Eastern."49 While Justice
Kennedy concurred in the plurality's judgment, he reasoned
that the Coal Act was unconstitutional because it violated
Eastern's due process rights under the Fifth Amendment. °
In an effort to formulate the necessary foundation for a
constitutional challenge to the Coal Act, the plurality
turned to previous challenges to the constitutionality of
similar pension plan legislation. Although these earlier
44. See id. at 159-60, 162.
45. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
46. Id.
47. 475 U.S. 211 (1986). The Court in Connolly identified three factors that
have a particular significance in ascertaining the existence of an uncompen-
sable taking by a regulation. These factors are: (1) the economic impact of the
regulation on the claimant; (2) the extent that the regulation interferes with the
claimant's reasonable investment-backed expectations; and (3) the nature of the
governmental action. See id. at 224-25.
48. See Eastern Enters. v. Chater, 110 F.3d at 160-61.
49. Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 538 (1998).
50. See id. at 538-51.
517
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challenges had failed, the plurality found support from
these "precedents" because these decisions "left open the
possibility that legislation might be unconstitutional if it
imposes severe retroactive liability on a limited class of par-
ties that could not have anticipated the liability, and the ex-
tent of that liability is substantially disproportionate to the
parties' experience."51
The plurality acknowledged that this case did not rep-
resent a traditional governmental "taking" of property, but
held that an "economic regulation such as the Coal Act may
nonetheless effect a taking." 2 Although an improper taking
typically exists when the government physically invades
private property, the plurality found the Takings Clause
applied here because "Eastern is 'permanently deprived of
those assets necessary to satisfy its statutory obligation...
to [the Combined Benefit Fund].' " The Court's evaluation
of the "justice and fairness" of the Coal Act was based upon
a reexamination of the Connolly factors employed by the
First Circuit to determine whether an unconstitutional
taking occurred.
The first Connolly factor requires an assessment of the
economic impact of the regulation in question on the claim-
ant. Applying this factor to Eastern's situation, the plural-
ity found that the Coal Act forced a considerable economic
burden on Eastern.54 Under the Coal Act, the Commissioner
of Social Security assigned health benefit payments for
greater than 1,000 retired mine workers and their families
to Eastern, a former coal operator.5 5 As a result of this as-
signment, Eastern's cumulative payments to the pension
fund were estimated to total $50 to $100 million.5 Because
this case did not involve the classic "taking" of an asset, the
Court focused on the proportionality of the economic impact
on Eastern.57 The plurality found that not only was this a
substantial liability for Eastern, but it also represented a
disproportionate liability compared to Eastern's experience
with the multiemployer benefit plan. Eastern had never
51. Id. at 528-29.
52. Id. at 523.
53. Id. (quoting Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 222
(1986)).
54. See id. at 529.
55. See id. at 516-17.
56. See id. at 529.
57. See id. at 529-37.
518 [Vol. 48
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participated in negotiations nor agreed to make contribu-
tions to the 1974 Benefit Plan the Coal Act regulated.58 In
fact, Eastern's involvement in this industry effectively ter-
minated when it transferred its coal mining operations to a
former subsidiary in 1965."9 The plurality found the amount
assessed against Eastern "resembling a calculation made in
a vacuum.
Under the second Connolly factor, the plurality held
that the Coal Act substantially interfered with Eastern's
reasonable investment-backed expectations.6 The Coal Act
imposed retroactive liability on Eastern's activities between
1946 and 1965, or more than thirty to fifty years ago.62 The
Court held this extremely retroactive effect "divest[s] East-
ern of property long after the company believed its liabili-
ties under [the previous pension fund were] settled."63 The
plurality viewed this as an unfairly imposed burden on
Eastern because of the Coal Act's "substantial" and "far
reaching" retroactivity.' The Court rejected the contention
by the Commissioner of Social Security that the coal indus-
try committed to fund lifetime benefits to its retirees, find-
ing that Eastern could not have anticipated the extent of
the retroactive liability imposed by the Coal Act.65 Eastern
simply did not make an agreement to provide lifetime
health care benefits to its retirees.66
Looking at the third Connolly factor, the plurality found
that the nature of the governmental action in singling out
Eastern to bear a substantial burden "unrelated to any
commitment [Eastern] made" was fundamentally unfair.
The Court not only found that the imposition of the liability
imposed by the Coal Act was based on conduct long ago,
58. See id. at 530.
59. See id.
60. Id. at 530.
61. See id. at 532; see also Eastern Enters. v. Chater, 110 F.3d 150, 161 (1st
Cir. 1997) (explaining "reasonable investment-backed expectations" as the fore-
seeability of "the specific form of intervention that a legislative solution would
take").
62. See Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. at 532.
63. Id. at 534.
64. Id. "The distance into the past that the Act reaches back to impose a li-
ability on Eastern and the magnitude of that liability raise substantial ques-
tions of fairness." Id.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. Id. at 537.
519
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thirty to fifty years prior, but also the amount of the finan-
cial burden was substantial, an estimated $100 million."
This left the plurality to conclude that to force Eastern "to
bear the expense of lifetime health benefits for miners
based on its activities decades before those benefits were
promised" would violate the fundamental fairness embodied
in the Takings Clause." Thus, the law as applied to Eastern
was held to impose a "severe retroactive liability on a lim-
ited class of parties that could not have anticipated the li-
ability, and the extent of that liability is substantially dis-
proportionate to the parties' experience. " 7°
D. Concurring Opinion
Although the plurality found it unnecessary to address
the constitutionality of the Coal Act under Eastern's sub-
stantive due process rights, Justice Kennedy believed this
was the appropriate analysis for finding Eastern's challenge
to the Coal Act unconstitutional.7 His main rationale for
rejecting the plurality's application of the Takings Clause
was that the Coal Act does not involve a specific property
interest, rather "the law simply imposes an obligation to
perform an act, the payment of benefits [on Eastern] .72
Further, Justice Kennedy found that a governmental action
of this nature had never before been considered a taking.
Instead, this was a governmental regulation that imposed
an "adverse economic effect," and not a taking."
Justice Kennedy found a basis for application of a Due
Process analysis from the many precedents that questioned
retroactive legislation.74 He argued that judicial history
68. A $5 million annual premium was assessed which was estimated to total
$100 million over time. See id. at 516-17.
69. Id. at 537.
70. Id. at 528-29.
71. See id. at 540.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 543.
74. See id. at 547 (explaining that "the Court has given careful consideration
to due process challenges to legislation with retroactive effects"); see also United
States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 31 (1994); Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v.
Construction Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 636-41 (1993); General Mo-
tors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 191 (1992); United States v. Sperry Corp.,
493 U.S. 52, 64 (1989); United States v. Herine, 476 U.S. 558, 567-72 (1986);
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 729-30
(1984); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976).
520 [Vol. 48
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supports that "due process requires an inquiry into whether
in enacting retroactive law the legislature acted in an arbi-
trary and irrational way."" Economic legislation that does
not pass this "test" must be invalidated. 6 Justice Kennedy
concluded that this is indeed a "rare [instance] where the
Legislature has exceeded the limits imposed by due proc-
ess" because Congress's enactment of the Coal Act is not ra-
tionally related to the legitimate interest asserted by the
government." He argued that the Coal Act does not impose
a reasonable liability and is "far outside the bounds of ret-
roactivity permissible under our law."78 Not only was East-
ern not responsible for the financial downfall of the mul-
tiemployer pension benefit plans, but also Eastern did not
create expectations on the part of the retirees for lifetime
health care benefits.79 Borrowing from the plurality's opin-
ion, Justice Kennedy concluded that this "expectation was
created by promises made long after Eastern left the coal
business.""0
E. Dissenting Opinion
Agreeing with the concurring opinion that the Takings
Clause is an inappropriate analysis for Eastern's case, the
dissent also turned to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment to address the constitutionality of the Coal
Act.8' Under a Due Process analysis, the dissent found that
the Coal Act was constitutional because its imposition on
Eastern was not "fundamentally unfair."2 Justice Breyer
concluded that since the assignment of retired miners to
Eastern was based upon the beneficiaries' previous em-
ployment with Eastern, the responsibility the Coal Act
places on Eastern to provide health care benefits was fun-
damentally fair and just.83 Specifically, the Act's "reach-
back" liability provision that operates to make Eastern re-
sponsible for miners it employed pre-1965 when Eastern
75. See Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. at 547.
76. See id.




81. See id. at 554.
82. See id.
83. See id. at 559.
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last participated in the coal industry, is not unconstitu-
tional.' The dissent reasoned that not only did Eastern
benefit from the labor of these mine workers, but also it was
Eastern's working conditions that created the health risks
to these miners. Additionally, the dissent cited various
government and industry actions, which Eastern partici-
pated in, that collectively served to create an expectation on
behalf of the mine workers that lifetime health benefits
would be provided by either the coal industry or Eastern or
both."6 For example, subsequent to the federal government
seizing the coal mines to end an industry-wide strike, a
health benefit program for the mine workers was estab-
lished and later financially supported by the government to
assure its viability.87 The dissent found that even though
the federal government and coal industry "did not neces-
sarily create contractually binding promises," reasonable
expectations for lifetime health care benefits were created.88
The dissent found further justification for Eastern's liability
from the profits Eastern continued to reap from the coal in-
dustry until 1980 through its wholly-owned subsidiary,
Eastern Associated Coal Corporation.89 Finally, because
"Eastern cannot show a sufficiently reasonable expectation
that it would remain free of future health care cost liability
for the workers whom it employed," Eastern's "legitimately
settled expectations" were not "unfairly upset" and the con-
stitutionality of the liability provision of the Coal Act
should be upheld.9
II. FIFTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGES TO THE COAL ACT
Not only did the justices disagree on the constitutional-
ity of the Coal Act, they also disagreed on the Fifth
Amendment provision that should be utilized in the consti-
84. See id.
85. See id. at 554.
86. See id. at 561.
87. See id. at 564-65. The government's role in promising health benefits to
mine workers began in 1946 with Congress's enactment of the Krug-Lewis
Agreement establishing health care benefits for mine workers. Subsequently,
pre-1965, Congress financially supported the multiemployer benefit plan in ef-
fect by providing tax benefits and aiding in hospital construction. See id.
88. Id. at 565.
89. See id.
90. Id. at 567-68.
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tutional analysis. When the decisional results are tallied,
five justices (Kennedy, concurring, and Breyer, joined by
Stevens, Souter, and Ginsberg, dissenting) believed that an
assessment of the Coal Act's effect upon due process rights
was appropriate.91 They argued that the Takings Clause of
the Fifth Amendment does not apply to Eastern's case. 92 In-
stead, a Due Process analysis was used to inquire into
whether the Coal Act was "fundamentally unfair or un-
just"93 as applied to Eastern, and whether the legislature
acted in an "arbitrary and irrational way" in promulgating
the retroactive Act.94
Although the conclusions derived from a Due Process
analysis were vastly different, the significance exists in the
agreement of its application to this case. The substantive
due process argument has not been successful in a retroac-
tivity challenge since the New Deal era,95 and the Supreme
Court has not invalidated economic legislation on substan-
tive due process grounds in more than sixty years.96 While
recognizing the Court's previously expressed concern in ap-
plying a due process analysis to "invalidate economic legis-
lation,"97 the plurality in Eastern nonetheless depended
upon precedents that "were grounded in due process."98 The
plurality acknowledged a "correlation" between the Takings
Clause analysis used and that of a due process analysis.99
The dissent identified this commonality as the fundamental
unfairness of retroactive liability upon settled expecta-
91. See id. at 538, 545, 552.
92. See id. Justice Kennedy stated that the Coal Act "must be invalidated as
contrary to essential due process principles, without regard to the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 539.
93. Id. at 558.
94. Id. at 547 (citing Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15
(1976)).
95. See Donald M. Falk, Justices Forestall Business Liabilities, 20 NAT'L L.
J. 50 (1998).
96. See Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (striking
down a Louisiana statute on due process grounds); see also Eastern Enters. v.
Chater, 110 F.3d 150, 158 (1st Cir. 1997) (explaining that Alton is no longer
good law).
97. Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. at 537 (quoting Ferguson v. Skrupa,
372 U.S. 726 (1963)) (abandoning "the use of the 'vague contours' of the Due
Process Clause to nullify laws which a majority of the Court believ[e] to be un-
wise").
98. Id. at 548.
99. Id. at 537-38.
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tions,'0 ° or arguably, the third Connolly prong to a takings
analysis, "the nature of the governmental action."'0 ' The
plurality, in fact, concluded that "the governmental action
implicat[ed] fundamental principles of fairness.")0 2
The reluctance of the plurality to interpret this as a
fundamental fairness analysis under the Due Process
Clause can be attributed to the Court's innate fear of revi-
talizing the bygone era of Lochner v. New York. °3 Subse-
quent to the Court's decision in Lochner, invalidating a
state law that limited "the freedom of master and employee
to contract" on due process grounds, it was common practice
for the Court to strike down state economic regulations
based upon the Court's ideals of what constituted proper
implementation of a state's policies.' 4 Lochner was recog-
nized as the epitome of the Court's broad application of the
substantive Due Process Clause to invalidate economic leg-
islation. Abandonment of this era did not occur until ap-
proximately fifty years later with the Court's decision in
Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc.,"05 when the
Court held that the Due Process Clause would no longer be
utilized "to strike down.., laws, regulatory of business and
industrial conditions, because they may be unwise, im-
provident or out of harmony with a particular school of
thought."?06 The Court received heavy criticism for "reading
its own philosophy into the Constitution and advocating ju-
dicial deference to Congress' economic views."0 7 Since then,
the modern Court has shied away from use of substantive
due process as a means of invalidating economic legislation.
As applied today, the substantive due process test evaluates
economic legislation to assure there is a "rational relation to
a legitimate governmental objective." 8 This means-end fit
100. See id. at 556-60.
101. Id. at 518 (quoting Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S.
211, 225 (1986)).
102. Id. at 537.
103. 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating a state law that limited the number of
hours a baker could work).
104. Id. at 64.
105. 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
106. Id. at 488.
107. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 74-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
108. William A. Montgomery, Jr., Constitutional Implications of CERCLA:
Due Process Challenges to Response Costs and Retroactive Liability, 31 J.
URBAN & CoNTEMp. L. 279, 286 (1987) (citing Williamson, 348 U.S. at 491).
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has developed into a "loose" test."°9 If a "reasonable" eco-
nomic regulation is promulgated to correct a public "evil,"
no substantive due process violation will be found."' Thus a
cautious approach developed in light of the Court's previous
longstanding practice of "Lochnerizing."
A due process challenge to economic legislation may
have gained some efficacy as a result of the concurrence and
dissent in Eastern Enterprises, but concededly the basic in-
quiry into a challenge remains the same. The challenger
must overcome a "presumption of constitutionality" by
showing "the legislature acted in an arbitrary and irra-
tional way.""' Even so, as Justice Kennedy recognized in his
concurrence, despite finding a substantive due process vio-
lation by the government, "[statutes may be invalidated on
due process grounds only under the most egregious of cir-
cumstances."12
Additionally, the Supreme Court has previously held
that this type of fragmented decision provides limited
precedential value."' The Court has found that when a case
lacks assent among five justices for a single rationale in ex-
planation of a decision, "the holding of the Court may be
viewed as that position taken by those Members who con-
curred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds .... ,1
Because Justice Kennedy's due process analysis was not
joined by at least four justices supporting the judgment, his
concurrence cannot be combined with the plurality's hold-
ing to establish a "majority rule," despite the common fun-
damental issues of fairness encompassed in both Justice
Kennedy's and the plurality's opinions."'
109. See id.; see also Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Construction La-
borers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 639 (1993) ("'U]nder the deferential stan-
dard of review applied in substantive due process challenges to economic legis-
lation there is no need for mathematical precision in the fit between
justification and means.").
110. Montgomery, supra note 108, at 286.
111. Association of Bituminous Contractors, Inc. v. Apfel, 156 F.3d 1246,
1255 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1,
15 (1976)).
112. Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 550 (1998).
113. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153 (1976).
114. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169 n.15 (1976).
115. See United States v. Dico, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 536, 543 (S.D. Iowa 1999);
Unity Real Estate Co. v. Hudson, 178 F.3d 649, 658-59 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding




Eastern Enterprises is not the first challenge to retroac-
tive legislation, nor will it be the last. It is true that retro-
actively applied laws run afoul of what we as a society hold
as fair and just.'16 As Justice Story stated in 1833, "[r]etro-
spective laws are.., generally unjust; and... neither ac-
cord with sound legislation nor with the fundamental prin-
ciples of the social compact." 
7
More than a century and a half later, the tenacity of
this belief was demonstrated by the Supreme Court deci-
sion in Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital. invali-
dating a retroactive federal administrative law. The Court
reaffirmed that retroactivity is generally disfavored in the
law, ruling that "congressional enactments and administra-
tive rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect
unless their language requires this result.""9 The Court
reasoned that imposition of liability for an act that was le-
gal when completed is potentially unfair.12 A concurring
opinion went so far as to claim that the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act bars retroactive rulemaking by administrative
agencies.' 21
More recently, in Landgraf v. USI Film Products,2 the
Supreme Court held that courts must not "give retroactive
a guiding principle").
116. See General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 191 (1992) (finding
that "[rietroactive legislation ... presents problems of unfairness that are more
serious than those posed by prospective legislation, because it can deprive citi-
zens of legitimate expectations and upset settled transactions"); Bowen v.
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (holding retroactivity is gen-
erally disfavored in the law).
117. 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION § 1398 (5th ed. 1891),
quoted in Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. at 533. In fact, the "Rule of Law"
embodied in our legal system disfavors retroactive lawmaking, as evidenced
most clearly in the criminal context by the ban on ex post facto laws.
118. 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988) (holding that the Medicare Act does not
authorize retroactive rulemaking).
119. Id. (citing support for this conclusion from the following Supreme Court
cases: Greene v. United States, 376 U.S. 149, 160 (1964); Claridge Apts. Co. v.
Comm'r, 323 U.S. 141, 164 (1944); Miller v. United States, 294 U.S. 435, 439
(1935); United States v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 276 U.S. 160, 162-63 (1928)).
120. See id. at 208.
121. See id. at 216-17. (Scalia, J., concurring); see also 5 U.S.C. § 551(4)
(1994). Specifically, the language of this section indicates that rules must be of
"future effect." Id.
122. 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
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effect to statutes burdening private rights unless Congress
ha[s] made clear its intent" to do so.23 Punitive damages
were held not to apply retroactively in compensating a
party for unlawful discrimination under the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 since allowing a retroactive effect would "attach
an important new legal burden" to the defendant's con-
duct. This decision was based on "the well-settled pre-
sumption against application of ... statutes that would
have genuinely 'retroactive' effect."125 Subsequent to this
case, a presumption against retroactive application of a
statute was found a necessary step by the judiciary in as-
sessing laws that lack a clear intent to legislate pre-
enactment conduct. 126 The develolment of a prospective pre-
sumption was firmly established. 27
Despite this historical bias against the retroactive leg-
islation, it purposefully survives in society in a variety of
laws. '2 For example, retroactive legislation promulgated in
the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972,129 the Multiemployer
123. Id. at 270 (holding that 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights Act of
1964 do not apply retroactively in a Title VII case).
124. Id. at 283.
125. Id. at 277; see also United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 898
(E.D.N.C. 1985); United States v. Stringfellow, 20 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1912
(C.D. Cal. 1984).
126. For an insightful discussion of the impact of the Landgraf v. USI Film
Products decision and the evolution of the presumption of prospectivity adopted
by the courts, see Jan G. Laitos, Legislative Retroactivity, 52 WASH. U. J. URR.
& CONTEMP. L. 81, 85, 122-32 (1997); see also id. n.13, stating:
The Landgraf opinion expands the definition of retroactivity to include
changes in the law which attach 'new legal consequences to events
completed before its enactment.'. . . After Landgraf, a law which in
the future disrupts certain settled expectations, imposes new obliga-
tions, or increases liability for past actions, is retroactive because the
law attaches new legal consequences to prior acts.
Id. (citations omitted).
127. See Gray B. Taylor, A Review of the Constitutionality of CERCLA in the
Wake of United States v. Olin Corp., 6 S.C. ENVTL. L.J. 61, 67 (1997) (discussing
that "Landgraf stands for the proposition that a court will presume prospective
application of a statute").
128. See, e.g., United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 110
(1801) (holding that where "a law intervenes and positively changes the rule
which governs, the law must be obeyed.., if... constitutional," but imploring
the courts to "struggle hard against a construction which will, by a retrospective
operation, affect the rights of parties"). See generally Bradley v. School Bd. of
Richmond, 416 U.S. 696 (1974); Thorpe v. Housing Auth. of Durham, 393 U.S.
268 (1969).
129. 30 U.S.C. § 901 (1969); see Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428
U.S. 1 (1976).
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Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980,13 and amendments
to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 1 1 in 1984,
have all survived constitutional challenges."
In Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 33 the Supreme
Court held that the imposition of retroactive liability is con-
stitutionally permissible, reasoning that "the imposition of
liability for the effects of disabilities bred in the past is jus-
tified as a rational measure to spread the costs of employ-
ees' disabilities to those who have profited from the fruits of
their labor."134 The Court concluded that "legislation read-
justing rights and burdens is not unlawful solely because it
upsets otherwise settled expectations .... This is true even
though the effect of the legislation is to impose a new duty
or liability based on past acts."35
In Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.,"5 de-
spite the Court's recognition that the retroactive with-
drawal liability effected by a multiemployer pension plan
resulted in a permanent deprivation of private assets by the
government, the Court held that the legislation in question
did not constitute a Fifth Amendment Takings Clause vio-
lation.137 The Court argued that "[iun the course of regulat-
ing commercial and other human affairs,... Congress rou-
tinely creates burdens for some that directly benefit,,131
others. Particularly significant was the Court's finding
that this retroactive liability had precedent over contractual
agreements in place by the parties involved that expressly
limited pension contributions. 9 Contractual obligations
130. 29 U.S.C §§ 1381-1461 (1980). See Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal.,
Inc. v. Construction Laborers Pension Trust for Southern Cal., 508 U.S. 602
(1993); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 475 U.S. 211, 226-27 (1986).
131. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1984); see Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray &
Co., 467 U.S. 717 (1984).
132. See, e.g., Bradley, 416 U.S. 696 (upholding statute imposing retroactive
application of attorney's fees award).
133. 428 U.S. 1 (1976).
134. Id. at 18.
135. Id. at 16; see Holland v. Keenan Trucking, Inc., C.A. No. 2:93-1223
(S.D.W.Va. 1995), affd, 102 F.3d 736, 740 (4th Cir. 1996) (expanding on the le-
gitimacy of Congress's power to enact corrective legislation by concluding
"when, as with the Coal Act, Congress legislates within the core of its commerce
power to regulate economic matters, such legislation carries a heavy presump-
tion of validity").
136. 475 U.S. 211 (1986).
137. See id. at 222.
138. Id. at 223.
139. See id. at 223-24.
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were overridden by Congress's power to apply corrective
economic legislation retroactively. 
40
Additionally, federal tax legislation applied retroac-
tively survived a constitutional challenge in the 1994 case,
United States v. Carlton.' When a Due Process Clause
analysis was made regarding the constitutionality of an
amendment to an estate tax law," the Court upheld the
statute, ruling that it was "neither illegitimate nor arbi-
trary."4 3 The Court reasoned that "Congress acted to correct
what it reasonably viewed as a mistake in the original 1986
provision that would have created a significant and unan-
ticipated revenue loss."'" Further, the amendment pre-
vented burdening "innocent" taxpayers, and since Congress
promptly promulgated the corrective measure, the amend-
ment "established a modest retroactivity period that ex-
tended only slightly longer than one year." 5
The Supreme Court has in fact endorsed Congress'
authority to enact retroactive legislation in instances when
it is "confined to short and limited periods required by the
practicalities of producing national legislation."46 In Pen-
sion Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co.," ' Congress
was concerned with the continuation of multiemployer pen-
sion benefits to vested employees and promulgated the Mul-
tiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act of 1980 to im-
pose mandatory payment obligations on employers exiting
the plan.' In effect, the law imposed payment liabilities on
employers who withdrew from multiemployer plans five
140. See id. (holding that "[clontracts, however express, cannot fetter the
constitutional authority of Congress").
141. 512 U.S. 26 (1994).
142. See 26 U.S.C. § 2057 (1988).
143. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 32. Some scholars have argued that this case effec-
tively dashed any future prospects of a successful Due Process challenge to a
retroactive imposition of tax liability. See, e.g., Faith Colson, Constitutional
Law-Due Process-The Supreme Court Sounds the Death Knell for Due Process
Challenges to Retroactive Tax Legislation: United States v. Carlton, 27 RUTGERs
L.J. 243 (1995); Laura Ricciardi & Michael B. W. Sinclair, Retroactive Civil Leg-
islation, 27 U. TOL. L. REV. 301 (1996).
144. Carlton, 512 U.S. at 32. Instead of a general taxation corrective meas-
ure, Congress chose to deny deductions in Employee Stock Ownership Plan
transactions "to those who had made purely tax-motivated stock transfers." Id.
145. Id. at 27.
146. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 731
(1984) (citing United States v. Darusmont, 449 U.S. 292, 296-97 (1981)).
147. 467 U.S. 717 (1984).
148. See id. at 721-25.
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months prior to the law's enactment. The Court found no
due process violation of the statute since "[t]he effective
date.., encompassed only that retroactive time period that




The most evident area where retroactive legislation
runs rampant involves CERCLA or the "Superfund" legisla-
tion. Enacted in 1980, the practicalities addressed by this
law involved finding an immediate and comprehensive solu-
tion for the serious pollution problems created by hazardous
waste sites that were abandoned or inactive.5 ° Indeed,
CERCLA was borne out of a need for corrective measures to
address several major environmental disasters that oc-
curred at that time. The public perceived hazardous waste
as a national crisis after the Love Canal 5 ' and Valley of the
Drums52 incidents.' Additionally, "CERCLA was a re-
sponse to the perceived deficiencies and inadequacies of ex-
149. Id. at 731.
150. For a general description of the "Superfund" legislation, see CERCLA
Overview, http://www.epa.gov/superfund/whatissf/cercla.htm (visited Mar. 26,
1999) (on file with the Buffalo Law Review). This law created a tax on the
chemical and petroleum industries and provided broad Federal authority to re-
spond directly to releases or threatened releases of hazardous substances that
may endanger public health or the environment. Over five years, $1.6 billion
was collected and the tax went to a trust fund for cleaning up abandoned or un-
controlled hazardous waste sites.
151. See DANIEL MAZMAN[AN & DAVID MORELL, BEYOND SUPERFAILURE:
AMERICA'S ToxIcs POLICY FOR THE 1990's 3, 27 (1992). Occidental Petroleum's
Hooker Chemical & Plastics Corporation disposed of more than twenty thou-
sand tons of hazardous waste at its Niagara Falls, New York, site during the
1940s and 1950s, resulting in contaminated groundwater. In 1977 when the Ni-
agara River overflowed, homes in Love Canal were contaminated with over two
hundred toxic chemicals and the area was declared a federal emergency disas-
ter location. See id.; see also Daniel A. Farber, Politics and Procedure in Envi-
ronmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 59, 66-67 (1992) (explaining that the pub-
lic pressure generated by Love Canal led to the enactment of federal
environmental laws).
152. See 1 ALLAN J. TOPOL & REBECCA SNOW, SUPERFUND LAW AND
PROCEDURE 3 (1992) (describing The Valley of the Drums as a ravine in Ken-
tucky where twenty thousand drums containing hazardous wastes were dis-
posed of and caused contaminated groundwater).
153. See Richard L. Revesz & Richard B. Stewart, The Superfund Debate, in
ANALYZING SUPERFUND: ECONOMICS, SCIENCE AND LAW 3, 5 (Richard L. Revesz &
Richard B. Stewart eds., 1995).
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isting federal environmental protection law, particularly
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act"54 which oper-
ated prospectively.' The purpose of CERCLA was to "pro-
vide for liability, compensation, cleanup, and emergency re-
sponse for hazardous substances released into the
environment and the cleanup of inactive hazardous waste
disposal sites."'56 In an attempt to conquer this task, Con-
gress's goal was to distribute the cleanup costs among the
responsible parties."'
The retroactive application of CERCLA liability has
been challenged since 1983, and the courts appear settled
on its constitutionality.15 In fact, all but one of approxi-
mately thirty federal courts that have addressed the ques-
tion of CERCLA's retroactive liability have ruled that
CERCLA's liability provisions apply to pre-enactment ac-
tivities.'59 Interestingly, the Supreme Court has never ad-
dressed the issue of CERCLA's retroactive effect. Lower
courts have predominantly interpreted CERCLA to apply
retroactively, recognizing that "Congress intended to have
the chemical industry, past, and present, pay for the costs
154. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-86 (1994 & Supp. II 1996) (codified as an amendment
to the Solid Waste Disposal Act).
155. See Nevada v. United States, 925 F. Supp. 691, 703 (D. Nev. 1996)
(citing United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1070-72 (D. Colo.
1985)); United States v. Wade, 546 F. Supp. 785, 792-93 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (finding
that CERCLA was "designed to plug gaps" in existing federal pollution laws).
156. S. REP. No. 69-848, at 2 (1980), reprinted in 1 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND
LIABILITY ACT OF 1980, at 308 (1983).
157. The two primary objectives of CERCLA are: (1) cleaning up hazardous
waste sites; and (2) holding the responsible parties liable for the cost of cleanup.
See S. REP. No. 848, at 12 (1980) cited in Montgomery, supra note 108, at 281 &
n.10.
158. See United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp.
823 (W.D. Mo. 1984), affd in part, rev'd in part, 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp.
1064 (D. Colo. 1985) (finding that responsible parties are liable for pre-
enactment government response costs); Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F.
Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
159. See Charles de Saillan, CERCLA Liability for Pre-Enactment Disposal
Activities: Nothing Has Changed, 11 No. 9 NAAG NAT'L ENVTL. ENFORCEMENT J.
3, 4 & n.14 (Oct. 1996) (explaining that the decision in United States v. Olin
Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1502 (S.D. Ala. 1996), is the only exception to almost thirty
court decisions that have upheld CERCLA's retroactive liability); see also
United States v. Olin Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1502, 1507 & n.25 (S.D. Ala. 1996),
rev'd, 107 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing an extensive list of cases which
have applied CERCLA liability on a retroactive basis).
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of cleaning up inactive hazardous waste sites."' Addition-
ally, § 9607(a) is recognized as "the sort of provision that
must be understood to operate retroactively because a con-
trary reading would render it ineffective."
16
'
This retroactive liability interpretation persists despite
the lack of express language in the Act requiring retroactive
application.' - Courts reached the conclusion that Congress
intended CERCLA to apply retroactively by utilizing a tex-
tual analysis of CERCLA's liability provision, and by delv-
ing into the legislative history of the Act. Specifically,
courts have focused on the past tense language contained in
CERCLA's liability provision to conclude that the Act is ret-
rospective.'63 They found that because § 9607(a) is written
in the past tense, this "indicat[es] that it applies to past ac-
tivities," and this makes it "manifestly clear that Congress
intended CERCLA to have retroactive effect."'6
160. Northeastern Pharm., 579 F. Supp. at 840; see also Louisiana-Pacific
Corp. v. ASARCO, Inc., 24 F.3d 1565, 1575 (9th Cir. 1994) ("CERCLA is to be
broadly interpreted to achieve its remedial goals."); United States v. Fleet Fac-
tors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir. 1990) ("In order to achieve the 'over-
whelmingly remedial' goal of the CERCLA statutory scheme, ambiguous statu-
tory terms should be construed to favor liability.. . .") (quoting Florida Power &
Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1317 (11th Cir. 1990)); Cali-
fornia v. Celtor Chem. Corp., 901 F. Supp 1481, 1490 (N.D. Cal. 1995) ("[Tjhe
Court has an obligation to construe CERCLA broadly to accomplish its remedial
goals."); United States v. Mottolo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 902 (D. N.H. 1985) ("[Tjhe
remedial intent of CERCLA requires a liberal statutory construction designed
to avoid frustration of the Act's purpose."); de Saillan, supra note 159, at 4.
161. Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1519 (quoting Landgrafv. USI Film Products, 511
U.S. 244, 286 (1994)).
162. See Nevada ex rel. Dep't of Transp. v. United States, 925 F. Supp. 691,
695 (D. Nev. 1996) (holding "the clear intent of Congress was to provide for ret-
roactive application of the CERCLA liability provisions"); Northeastern Pharm.,
810 F.2d at 733; Shell Oil, 605 F. Supp. at 1079 (holding "the whole purpose
and scheme of CERCLA is retrospective and remedial"); Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp.
at 1313-14 (concluding that "the Congressional intent to make industry pay for
the clean up costs must be interpreted as an intent to authorize lawsuits which
impose liability retroactively upon transporters").
163. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2)(3)(4) (1994) (stating that liability applies to
"[amny person who... owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous
substances were disposed of, any person who... arranged for disposal.., of
hazardous substances... any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous
substances ... shall be liable") (emphasis added).
164. United States v. Stringfellow, 20 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1912, 1915
(C.D. Cal. 1984) (concluding that CERCLA's § 107 "is constructed in the past
tense, indicating that it applies to past activities"); see also Northeastern
Pharm., 810 F.2d at 732-33; Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. at 1300; Michelle LeVeque,
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The legislative history of CERCLA also lent support to
a finding of retroactive liability under the Act. When the
retroactive liability issue was first addressed by the courts
in 1983, the court in Brown v. Georgeoff65 concluded from
an examination of CERCLA's legislative history that "[t]he
Congressional intent to make industry pay for the cleanup
costs must be interpreted as an intent to authorize lawsuits
which impose liability retroactively....,1 6 A later court
agreed that Congress must have intended CERCLA to have
retroactive application, reasoning that CERCLA is by na-
ture retrospective because "[m]any of the human acts that
have caused the pollution already had taken place before its
enactment; physical and chemical processes are at their
pernicious work, carrying destructive forces into the fu-
ture."'67 Further, the acts that resulted in hazardous con-
tamination were the very targets of CERCLA legislation.'68
This view was confirmed by the Eighth Circuit in United
States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co.,
69
where the court upheld the law's retroactive effect finding
that "CERCLA's backward-looking focus is confirmed by the
legislative history."7°
However, not all courts agreed that the legislative his-
tory of CERCLA supports its retroactive application.''
Products: Overcoming the Presumption Against Retroactivity, 59 OHIO ST. L. J.
603, 605-06 (1998); Taylor, supra note 127, at 61. Cf Nevada v. United States,
925 F. Supp. 691 (D. Nev. 1996) (holding that "CERCLA's text and structure
reveal clear congressional intent to apply the response cost liability section ret-
roactively" but not relying on past verb tenses to reach this conclusion); United
States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064 (D. Colo. 1985) (finding that retroac-
tive application of CERCLA liability is consistent with legislative intent on dif-
ferent grounds).
165. 562 F. Supp. 1300 (N.D. Ohio 1983).
166. Id. at 1313-14 (upholding the imposition of liability for pre-enactment
waste disposal on transporters).
167. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. at 1072.
168. See CERCLA preamble, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (ex-
plaining that the purpose of CERCLA is "to provide for.., the cleanup of inac-
tive hazardous waste disposal cites").
169. 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987).
170. Id. at 732, 733 ("Congress intended CERCLA to apply retroactively.");
see also United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. de-
nied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1989) (upholding CERCLA's retroactive liability based on
congressional intent); de Saillan, supra note 159, at 8-11.
171. See, e.g., United States v. Olin Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1502 (S.D. Ala.
1996), rev'd, 107 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1997). Justice Hand held in this district
court opinion that "Congress did not clearly express its intent that the liability
provision of CERCLA be retroactive..." and "CERCLA itself has almost no
20001 533
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These courts point to the lack of actual history available for
CERCLA.'72 In particular, a conference report, which is a
standard mechanism for recording legislative background,
does not even exist for CERCLA.' 7' It was postulated by
some that CERCLA was a hastily constructed compromise
by a lame duck Congress on an emergency basis, making
the intent behind the Act murky at best. 74
The only court to ever rule that CERCLA is unconstitu-
tional because of its retroactive liability was the Alabama
District Court in 1996.175 In United States v. Olin Corp.,75
CERCLA's liability provisions were found not to apply ret-
roactively, and the Act was held unconstitutional because it
exceeded Congress's commerce clause authority. 177 As a ba-
sis for his argument, Judge Hand relied on the 1994 case,
Landgrafv. USI Film Products,'78 which held that there is a
presumption against retroactive application of a statute
legislative history." Id. at 1503, 1513; see also Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff,
562 F. Supp. 1300, 1311 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (finding "the precise issue of retroac-
tivity... was not addressed in Congressional debates").
172. See Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1503, 1513; see also Artesian Water Co. v.
Government of New Castle County, 851 F.2d 643, 648 (3d Cir. 1988) (finding
that "CERCLA is not a paradigm of clarity or precision" and "[iut has been criti-
cized frequently for inartful drafting and numerous ambiguities attributable to
its precipitous passage").
173. See George Clemon Freeman, Jr., Inappropriate and Unconstitutional
Retroactive Application of Superfund Liability, 42 Bus. LAW. 215, 223 (1986).
174. See LeVeque, supra note 164, at 605; see also FRANK P. GRAD, TREATISE
ON ENViRONMENTAL LAW § 4A.02(2)(a), at 4A-78.176 (1998) (discussing
CERCLA's unusual legislative history). But see de Saillan, supra note 159, at 8-
11 (explaining that "although [CERCLA's legislative history] may be frag-
mented and incomplete," it is substantial and does "provide[] valuable insight to
many of CERCLA's provisions").
175. See de Sallan, supra note 159, at 4 & n.15; see also Mary Francis Pali-
sano, United States v. Olin Corporation: How a Polluter Got Off Clean, 15 PACE
ENVTL. L. REV. 401, 402 (1997).
176. 927 F. Supp. 1502 (S.D. Ala. 1996), rev'd, 107 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir.
1997).
177. See id. at 1503. The District court's decision in Olin was subsequently
not followed by a group of cases. See, e.g., Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Agway, Inc., 987
F. Supp. 92 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (declining to follow Olin); United States v. Glidden
Co., 3 F. Supp.2d 823 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (concluding that Congress intended
CERCLA to have a retroactive effect); Gould Inc. v. A & M Battery and Tire
Serv., 933 F. Supp. 431 (M.D. Pa. 1996) (holding that "we are unpersuaded by
the determination of the... District Court... which declared [Superfimd] un-
constitutional as it purports to impose retroactive liability"); Nevada v. United
States, 925 F. Supp. 691 (D. Nev. 1996); United States v. NL Indus., Inc. 936 F.
Supp. 545 (S.D. IlM. 1996) (declining to follow Olin).
178. 511 U.S. 244 (1994).
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that can only be overcome by clear evidence of congressional
intent.79 Since Judge Hand found this intent lacking in
CERCLA, both in the statutory language and in the legisla-
tive background, he concluded that the liability sections of
CERCLA are not retroactive. 80
This determination was short-lived as the Eleventh
Circuit unanimously reversed the decision on appeal. 8' Re-
sponding to the District Court's conclusion that liability
costs only apply to waste disposal acts subsequent to
CERCLA's enactment date, Judge Kravitch stated that
"this ruling not only conflicts with this court's recent de-
scription of CERCLA, but also runs contrary to all other de-
cisions on point."8 2 This conclusion effectively dashed any
new support the Olin case may have provided for over-
turning CERCLA on retroactive liability grounds. This
ruling restored this issue to firm ground, and consequently,
any new challenges have the burden of overcoming this
formidable judicial predisposition.
Concurrent with the judicial interpretation of
CERCLA's retroactivity that was taking place, Congress
faced the formidable task of addressing CERCLA's retroac-
tive liability in considering CERCLA's reauthorization. 3
Subsequent to the expiration of the Superfund's taxing
authority in 1985, Congress passed the 1986
reauthorization bill, Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act (SARA).' Although SARA signifi-
cantly altered aspects of CERCLA, the amendments did not
restrict the retroactive liability of the original Act.8 5 Many
saw the inaction of Congress on this matter as the intent to
179. See Olin, 927 F. Supp. at 1511-12 (citing Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 286).
180. See id. at 1519.
181. See United States v. Olin Corp., 107 F.3d 1506 (11th Cir. 1997).
182. Id. at 1511-12.
183. See Nancy K. Kubasek et al., Retroactive Liability Under the Super-
fund. Time to Settle the Issue, 13 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 197, 206 (1997).
184. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
185. See Kubasek et al., supra note 183, at 208 & n.67 (citing David J.
Hayes & Conrad B. MacKerron, Superfund II: A New Mandate, A BNA Special
Report, 17 ENV'T REP. 1, 1-2 (1987) (enumerating several revisions SARA made
to the original Act, including "strict cleanup standards strongly favoring per-
manent remedies at waste sites, stronger EPA control... mandatory schedule
for initiation of cleanup work and studies... increased state and public in-
volvement in the cleanup decision-making process..." and an increase in
funding to $8.5 billion over five years "raised through a new $2.5 billion broad
based tax on business income and ... petroleum...-)).
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maintain the retroactive liability application of CERCLA. 88
Indeed a popular belief was that SARA was a "misnomer,"
and a more accurate reference to the reauthorization was
RACHEL-the "Reauthorization Act Confirms How Every-
one's Liable."'87 Since a reenactment of a statute incorpo-
rating settled case law has been held by the Supreme Court
to "include[U the settled judicial interpretation of the stat-
ute,"188 the courts and the legislature appeared in synchro-
nism on the issue of CERCLA's retroactive application.
IV. A COMPARISON-THE CoAL ACT AND CERCLA
The glaring commonality between the Coal Act and
CERCLA is that both Acts do not contain explicit state-
ments regarding their retroactivity. The judiciary has in-
stead interpreted the implicit intent of these laws to find
retroactive liability application. Specifically, there was no
explicit promise to pay lifetime health care benefits to mine
workers and their families prior to the 1974 National Bitu-
minous Coal Wage Agreement between the United Mine
Workers of America and the Bituminous Coal Operators'
Association.'89 Nevertheless, because the Coal Act effec-
tively merges the 1950 Benefit Plan with the 1974 Benefit
Plan, the Coal Act is interpreted as financially protecting
lifetime health care benefits for retirees under the later
agreement, despite the fact that these benefits were never
explicitly promised.9 This interpretation persists despite a
stated congressional intent behind the Coal Act "to make no
attempt to rewrite the collective bargaining agreements to
penalize.., conduct or to readjust the contractual rights
and liabilities of the parties to the [National Bituminous
186. See de Saillan, supra note 159, at 11; Kubasek et al., supra note 183, at
208-09.
187. Robert H. Abrams, Superfund and the Evolution of Brownfields, 21
WM. & MARY ENvTL. L. & POLY REV. 265, 271 (1997).
188. de Saillan, supra note 159, at 11 (citing Herman & MacLean v. Hud-
dleston, 459 U.S. 375, 384-86 (1983); Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 581
(1978)).
189. See Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 553 & n.3 (1998) (citing Da-
von, Inc. v. Shalala, 75 F.3d 1114, 1124-25) (7th Cir. 1996) ("It is undisputed
that the [National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreements] did not contain an ex-
plicit promise of lifetime benefits until the 1974... agreement.")).
190. See id. Eastern's payment obligations under the Coal Act were seen as
assessments made "without any regard to responsibilities that Eastern accepted
under any benefit plan the company itself adopted." Id. at 531.
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Coal Wage Agreements] ."'
Similarly, CERCLA is consistently interpreted by case
law to apply retroactively even though the Act does not ex-
plicitly state that it applies to past conduct.'92 As previously
discussed, courts have relied upon past tense language
utilized in the liability provision, § 9607(a), to infer intent
by Congress that the liability must apply retroactively.'93
Looking at this liability provision, § 9607(a) enumerates
four categories of "potentially responsible parties" (PRPs)
CERCLA covers when "there is a release, or a threatened
release [of a hazardous substance] which causes the incur-
rence of response costs .... ,,194 The liable parties include:
the owner or operator of a vessel or a facility [from which a release
or threatened release of a hazardous substance occurs], any person
who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or
operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were
disposed of, any person who ... arranged for disposal or treat-
ment, of hazardous substances... at any facility.., owned or op-
erated by another party... and any person who accepts or ac-
cepted any hazardous substances for transport to disposal or
treatment facilities... [he or she] selected ....
This section goes on to specify the "recoverable costs
and damages" that apply to violations under CERCLA.' 9'
Blatantly absent from this liability section is any specific
time limit on recovery for pre-enactment activities. How-
ever, courts have interpreted the past tense language util-
ized by Congress as indicative of the intent to apply liability
to responsible parties on a retroactive basis.'97 This judicial
interpretation survives despite the recognition that other
CERCLA provisions do not apply retroactively.9
CERCLA imposes a strict retroactive liability unlike
the conditional retroactive liability promulgated by the Coal
Act that allows for more flexibility in application. The eco-
191. Mary Helen Coal Corp. v. Hudson, 976 F. Supp. 366, 369 (E.D. Va.
1997), rev'd, 164 F.3d 624 (4th Cir. 1998).
192. See Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F. Supp. 1300 (D. Ohio 1983);
see also LeVeque, supra note 164, at 605-06.
193. See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
194. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994).
195. Id. (emphasis added).
196. Id.
197. See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
198. See de Saillan, supra note 159, at 6 (discussing §§ 402(b) and 109(c)).
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nomic retroactive liability of the two laws is distinctly dif-
ferent. The "reach-back" provision under § 9706(a) of the
Coal Act imposes a conditional liability.' This section
states that the application of liability to a coal operator is
based upon a hierarchy of assignments to a "signatory op-
erator" (SO) for each eligible retiree beneficiary."' The
Commissioner of Social Security directs assignment to a SO
who remains in business in the following order: (1) first, to
a SO who signed the most recent multiemployer pension
plan and was the most recent SO to employ the retiree for
at least two years, (2) if that SO is not available, the retiree
is assigned to the most recent SO to employ the coal indus-
try retiree who was a signatory to the 1978 Coal Wage
Agreement, (3) finally, if a SO under either of the first two
categories is not available, the retiree is assigned to the SO
that employed the worker in the coal industry for "a longer
period of time than any other [SO] prior to the effective date
of the 1978 Coal Wage Agreement."2"' Effectively, the
"reach-back" liability applies only when no other SO is
available and applies only to miners employed by the opera-
tor.02 Through this process of liability application, it is clear
that whether a SO is liable for premiums to the multiem-
ployer fund depends upon the other employers in the coal
industry who might be found liable °.20 Thus, the Coal Act's
purpose to "stabilize [multiemployer pension] plan funding
and allow for the provision of health care benefits to [coal
industry] retirees" is realized, but not at any cost to past
participants.
20 4
Additionally, Congress provided means for "relief' to
the coal operators. The Coal Act contains provisions for
transfer of moneys from other coal agreement pension funds
and the Abandoned Mine Reclamation Fund to mitigate the
operators' liability for unassigned retirees.0 5 In fact, "the
Coal Act authorizes the use of $210 million from the 1950
Pension Plan ... to defray the cost of furnishing health




203. See id.; see also Eastern Enters. v. Chater, 110 F.3d 150, 158 (1st Cir.
1997) (explaining the hierarchical order of assignment and the statutory shield
that exists for companies that are third in the hierarchy).
204. Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 514 (1998).
205. See 26 U.S.C. § 9705(a)(3)(b) (1994).
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benefits .... , 206 Admittedly, this provision is limited to "or-
phan" retirees who are unable to be assigned to an em-
ployer in the industry. However, further relief also exists in§ 9706(f)(6) of the Coal Act, which preserves the right of a
party to seek indemnification from others in a separate civil
action.27 This section effectively "helps to diminish the Act's
'economic impact' by mitigating the financial liability im-
posed by the Act.
8
This is unlike CERCLA which imposes strict, joint and
several liability on the four broad categories of PRPs under§ 9607.09 Basically, "CERCLA applies to essentially any ac-
tual or threatened release of a hazardous substance
whether at an inactive or active site, regardless of the ap-
plicability of other statutes,"10 and parties who were in-
volved in any aspect of handling hazardous materials are
subject to liability for disposal of the waste.211 Adding to the
broad imposition of the Act, the retroactive liability provi-
sion in CERCLA is virtually unlimited in its applicable time
frame. Courts have upheld CERCLA's retroactive liability
in situations where the disposal of hazardous waste oc-
curred several decades in the past.212 Significantly, the dis-
206. Eastern Enters. v. Chater, 110 F.3d at 161.
207. See 26 U.S.C. § 9706(f)(6).
208. Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. at 567.
209. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994); United States v. Hardage, 982 F.2d
1436, 1443 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub. nom. Advance Chem. Co. v. United
States, 510 U.S. 913 (1993); O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 182 & n.9 (1st Cir.
1989) (finding that CERCLA liability is strict); Idaho v. Hanna Mining Co., 882
F.2d 392, 394 (9th Cir. 1989) (finding CERCLA imposes strict liability); United
States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 167 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S.
1106 (1989) (finding CERCLA's retroactive liability is strict, joint and several).
210. Adam Babich, Understanding the New Era in Environmental Law, 41
S.C. L. REV. 733, 750 (1990).
211. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1994). As previously outlined, these parties
include: (1) owners and operators of facilities or vessels; (2) any person who
owned or operated any facility for the disposal of hazardous substances; (3) any
person who arranged for disposal of hazardous materials at any facility oper-
ated or owned by another party; and (4) any person who transports hazardous
substances.
212. See, e.g., United States v. Glidden Co., 3 F. Supp.2d 823, 839 (N.D.
Ohio 1997) (holding that CERCLA applied retroactively to site where disposal of
hazardous waste "occurred at least twenty years prior"); United States v. Shell
Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064 (D. Colo. 1985) (finding Shell liable for hazardous
waste clean-up under CERCLA for disposal activities dating back to 1947);
United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982)
(imposing liability on coal tar refiner who had generated and disposed of chemi-
cal wastes for more than 50 years prior to CERCLA's enactment); United States
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posal may have been accomplished properly at the time, but
one or more of the PRPs may still be found liable many
years later. This vast and seemingly open-ended imposition
of retroactive liability led one author to accurately depict
CERCLA's effect as "a black hole that indiscriminately de-
vours all who come near it."
213
This "rigid" approach to solving environmental pollu-
tion problems through CERCLA prevents leniency in its
application. The window of opportunity for challenges is
almost non-existent. In some cases, under CERCLA there
are virtually no defenses available to a claimant.214 This is
in sharp contrast to the Coal Act, where the First Circuit in
Eastern Enterprises found that "the fact that the Coal Act
contains provisions which moderate the statutory toll is
also probative of a constitutionally tolerable economic im-
pact.
,15
Although the purpose of both CERCLA and the Coal
Act is to impose economic liability on responsible parties to
remedy dire situations, the industries aimed at are vastly
different. The size of the environmental problem to be
tackled by CERCLA can be ascertained by the multi-million
dollar Superfund created by the Act.1 CERCLA's broad
remedial purpose is arguably seen as the only means to
combat a problem of this magnitude. The harm inflicted by
hazardous waste contamination is to the public at large,
which seemingly justifies CERCLA's joint and several ret-
roactive liability scheme. Further, the nature of the activity
associated with the coal mining operations may be viewed
as more valuable than that associated with manufacturing
facilities that generate hazardous wastes. Indeed, the gov-
ernment recognized the essential contribution connected to
the coal industry when it stepped in to resolve a nationwide
coal miners strike in 1946.217
Conversely, the size of the retroactive burden addressed
v. Vertac Chem. Corp., 489 F. Supp. 870 (E.D. Ark. 1980) (holding herbicide
manufacturer liable under CERCLA for hazardous waste disposal activities
from the 1940s).
213. Jerry L. Anderson, The Hazardous Waste Land, VA. ENVTL. L. J. 1, 6-7
(1993).
214. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b); see also cases cited supra note 209.
215. Eastern Enters. v. Chater, 110 F.3d 150, 161 (1st Cir. 1997).
216. See Babich, supra note 210, at 749.
217. See Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 505 (1998) (citing Exec. Or-
der No. 9728, 11 Fed. Reg. 5593 (1946)).
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by the Coal Act is comparatively smaller, allowing for a di-
rect connection of the liability to the offending parties. The
nexus of the burden imposed by the Coal Act to the respon-
sible party is made with much more specificity than is pos-
sible under CERCLA's expansiveness. A "clear causal link"
based on a "one-to-one relationship" can be meted out under
the Coal Act's single liability scheme.218 Proportional appli-
cation of the Coal Act may be preserved. This contrasts
with CERCLA, where liability is viewed as disproportionate
to the problem to be remedied, often times imposing what
are interpreted as punitive damages.219 Indeed, the "retroac-
tive punishment" associated with CERCLA is distinctly dif-
ferent from the "retroactive adjustment of compensatory
obligations" associated with the Coal Act.
220
Under a fundamental fairness analysis, both the Coal
Act and CERCLA place liability upon the parties that re-
ceived a benefit. For example, the Coal Act applies only to
the coal operators who actually employed the mine workers
and reaped the benefit of their efforts. 22' An exception to
this rule is made when the employers are no longer in busi-
ness to bear the responsibility for health care benefits,
leaving "orphan" retirees.222 In these instances, the Coal Act
provides for a proportional assignment to the coal operators
remaining in business to cover the retirees' health care
needs.23 Arguably, CERCLA imposes liability upon those
who benefited from the use of the natural resources.
Additionally, the legitimate expectation interests of
parties under CERCLA and the Coal Act are vastly differ-
ent. CERCLA focuses on activities that were lawful at one
time to correct present harms from past acts.224 Although
the Coal Act is also remedial legislation, this statute is not
deeming a past lawful activity now unlawful. Contracts ex-
isted between the coal operators and their employees as a
result of good faith negotiations for pension benefits.225 The
218. Freeman, supra note 173, at 246 (discussing the Usery v. Turner Elk-
horn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976), decision and its applicability to CERCLA).
219. See id.
220. Id. at 246-47
221. See 26 U.S.C. § 9706(a) (1994).
222. See id. §§ 9703(f), 9704(d).
223. See id.
224. See supra pp. 530-32 (discussing CERCLA's application to prior lawful
acts).
225. See Eastern Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 503-11 (1998) (discussing
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employers had legitimate expectations for a certain amount
of health benefit and retirement moneys to be paid to em-• 221
ployees as a result of signed agreements. These settled
expectations were upset by subsequent legislation that al-
tered the employers' responsibilities. 7 Certainly, compara-
tively diminished expectations existed for the actors under
CERCLA. Although no laws existed which mandated tort
liability for hazardous waste disposal acts, there was only a
limited expectation of non-liability for contaminating areas
with known toxins. Pre-CERCLA, manufacturers were
mainly concerned with the efficiencies of hazardous waste
disposal which ultimately led to the creation of many haz-
ardous waste sites.228 These acts were not unlawful at the
time, but they were accomplished with abandon regarding
public health and environmental safety.
V.THE IMPACT OF EASTERN ENTERPRISES V. APFEL
A. Coal Act Challenges
Some claimants have looked to the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Eastern Enterprises to find support for constitu-
tional challenges to retrospective laws. A recent case was
successful in challenging the Coal Act on this basis. In
Mary Helen Coal Corp. v. Hudson,2 9 a coal operator brought
suit against the trustees of the benefit plan claiming that
the Coal Act violated its Fifth Amendment constitutional
rights.' ° Like Eastern Enterprises, Mary Helen Coal had
discontinued its involvement in the coal industry many
years prior to the 1974 multiemployer benefit agreement
and the enactment of the Coal Act in 1992.231 Mary Helen
Coal argued that it had not "engaged in coal mining nor




228. See CRAIG E. COLTON & PETER N. SKINNER, THE ROAD TO LovE CANAL:
MANAGING INDUSTRIAL WASTE BEFORE E.P.A. 46 (1996) (discussing hazardous
waste disposal practices in the 1940s and 1950s).
229. 976 F. Supp. 366 (E.D. Va. 1997), rev'd, 164 F.3d 624 (4th Cir. 1998).
230. See id. at 367 (claiming a violation of the Takings Clause and the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment),
231. See id. at 369-70.
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employed coal miners since 1963," and additionally, had not
"contributed in [any] way to any legitimate expectation of
lifetime benefits for [union] retirees or their dependents."232
Consequently, the former coal operator alleged that the
monetary assessments imposed on it by the Coal Act were
"arbitrary, irrational, and contrary to the rationale of the
Coal Act" in violation of its Fifth Amendment rights. 3
Mary Helen Coal asserted that these assessments would ef-
fectively "render it insolvent."234 The District Court dis-
agreed with Mary Helen Coal's argument, instead pointing
to "the plethora of case law to the contrary" and Mary
Helen Coal's alleged involvement in creating a "legitimate
expectation of lifetime health benefits" to retired mine-
workers and their families as rationale for upholding the
Coal Act as it applied to Mary Helen Coal.3 5 On appeal, the
Fourth Circuit held the decision in abeyance pending the
outcome of Eastern Enterprises.236 Subsequently, the court
ruled in favor of Mary Helen Coal because its case was "ma-
terially indistinguishable from Eastern."
2 37
The Association of Bituminous Contractors made an
unsuccessful challenge to the Coal Act's constitutionality in
1998.238 Although the Court of Appeals upheld the constitu-
tionality of the Coal Act in Association of Bituminous Con-
tractors, Inc. v. Apfel, interestingly, the sole constitutional
argument made by the appellant was a due process rights
violation. 9 Recognizing that "analysis of legislation under
the Takings and Due Process Clauses is correlated to some
extent," but not equivalent, the court left the impression
that a Takings Clause challenge may have reaped a differ-
232. Id. at 370.
233. Id. Benefit plan trustees demanded Mary Helen Coal make health
benefit payments from 1993 to the present.
234. Id. Although no total dollar assessment was provided, the court noted
that payments owed by Mary Helen Coal to the combined fund for the period
March 12, 1996 through June 30, 1997 were approximately $617,000.
235. Id. at 375-76.
236. See Mary Helen Coal Corp. v. Hudson, No. 97-2331, 1998 WL 708687,
at *1 (4th Cir. 1998).
237. Id.
238. See Association of Bituminous Contractors, Inc. v. Apfel, 156 F.3d 1246
(D.C. Cir. 1998). The Association of Bituminous Contractors is described as a
"multi-employer association of contractors that specialize in coal mine construc-
tion and related projects," created as a negotiating entity for collective bar-
gaining agreements with the United Mine Workers of America. Id. at 1248.
239. See id. at 1253, 1258.
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ent result for the appellant.2 4' Even though the plurality in
Eastern Enterprises did not address a due process claim by
Eastern, the Circuit Court here found this precedent rele-
vant to its decision.24' The court held that "if the Associa-
tion's members were in substantially similar factual cir-
cumstances to Eastern, we would be compelled to
resolve.., whether the quality and quantity of retroactive
liability identified in Eastern Enterprises also violates the
Due Process Clause., 4 ' However, the court went on to rec-
ognize that the Association's case was factually dissimilar
to Eastern's situation. 3 A key distinguishing factor was the
Association's current participation in the coal industry, an
industry that Eastern had exited in 1965.244 Because the
Association's members were still involved in the coal indus-
try, the court could not find a disproportionate and unfairly
retroactive effect imposed on it by the Coal Act. 45 Stated
succinctly by the court, "the only binding aspect of Eastern
Enterprises is its specific result-holding the Coal Act un-
constitutional as applied to Eastern Enterprises."246
B. Other Retroactive Laws
Other subsequent challenges to the constitutionality of
retroactive statutes have not fared well. For example, as a
cited precedent to a challenge to the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938," the court found the Eastern Enterprises deci-
sion inapplicable.248 The court concluded that the plaintiffs'
takings claim was "not properly before [the court]" on juris-
dictional grounds. u9 Although the court lacked standing to
hear the employees' takings claim, the court distinguished
240. Id. at 1253-54. The court pointed out that the appellant appeared to
have made a Takings Clause argument by utilizing the three-factor analysis of
Connolly, but never actually brought a Takings Clause claim against the consti-
tutionality of the Coal Act. As a result, the court was forced to restrict its analy-
sis of this case to a due process challenge. See id. at 1254.
241. See id. at 1255 & n.6.




246. Id. at 1255 (discussing the government's argument) (emphasis added).
247. 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1989).
248. See Adams v. Hinchman, 154 F.3d 420, 426 & n.9 (concluding that the
Eastern Enterprises decision does not "affect the outcome of this case").
249. Id. at 425-26.
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this case from Eastern Enterprises since "[the] plaintiffs
here are not threatened with a taking by a 'challenged stat-
ute' that 'requires a direct transfer of funds' from them to
the government."25 ' Further, "the circumstances found to
support district court jurisdiction in Eastern Enterprises do
not exist in this case.
' 51
C. CERCLA Challenges
In United States v. Vertac Chemical Corp.252 a CERCLA
constitutional challenge was brought by defendants in
seeking to escape the government's recovery of $102 million
in response costs associated with the cleanup of an aban-
doned herbicide and chemical manufacturing waste site in
Arkansas. 23 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
placed the Vertac Chemical site on its National Priority List
(NPL) of Superfund sites in 1983, and initiated removal of
more than 28,500 drums of dioxins and other toxic wastes
in 1987.254 The defendants were held jointly and severally
liable for these response costs, despite their argument that
"the actions of the [EPA] were arbitrary, capricious and not
in accordance with law."255 Although not central to the de-
fendants' argument, they requested the court readdress the
constitutionality of the retroactive application of CERCLA
in light of the Eastern Enterprises decision. 25 The court
found Eastern Enterprises inapplicable, reasoning that the
issue of CERCLA's constitutionality had been previously
litigated in this case and resolved in favor of upholding
CERCLA's constitutionality.27 Because the defendants were
found liable for the hazardous waste contamination at Ver-
tac's site, the court held that "[t]here is no basis to warrant
reconsideration of the constitutionality of CERCLA."2
5 8
Giving absolutely no weight to Eastern Enterprises, the
court instead cited precedents upholding CERCLA's retro-
250. Id. (citing In re Chateaugay Corp., 53 F.3d 478, 493 (2d Cir. 1995)).
251. Adams, 154 F.3d at 426 & n.9.
252. 33 F. Supp.2d 769 (E.D. Ark. 1998).
253. See id. at 772. Reimbursement to the government is sought under
CERCLA's liability section, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(a) (1996).
254. See Vertac Chemical Corp., 33 F. Supp.2d at 771-72.
255. Id. at 771.
256. See id. at 784-85.





VI. THE EVOLVEMENT OF A "MORE FAIR" CERCLA
Although it is not likely there will any sweeping invali-
dation of CERCLA's strict retroactive liability scheme in
the aftermath of Eastern Enterprises, it is worth noting that
the tripartite dynamics of judicial, administrative, and leg-
islative law over the nineteen years since its enactment has
resulted in a lessening of the harshness of the application of
liability under CERCLA today. The pendulum has swung
over time, albeit slowly and erratically in certain instances,
towards a more fair application of retroactive liability under
CERCLA. This development was inevitable as the public's
focus on hazardous waste site problems abated, rightly or
wrongly, with the perception that a solution was in prog-
ress. Indeed, the national environmental crisis addressed
by CERCLA had seemingly passed. Additionally, economic
reasons acted to "push the pendulum" towards change. For
example, diminished property values, negative impacts in
investment markets, and transaction costs of CERCLA that
often dwarfed cleanup costs26 all contributed to the neces-
sity for change.
The best way to comprehend this "evolution towards
fairness" as it pertains to CERCLA is by reviewing the de-
velopments in each of the three component parts of this
law-developing framework-statutory law, regulatory law,
and common law. A prime example of the interaction of
these entities demonstrating this evolvement is seen in the
Lender Liability Statutory Protections passed by Con-
gress. '6 These protections are aimed at insulating lenders
from liability under the Superfund.
259. See id. (citing United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810
F.2d 726, 732-34 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848 (1987); United
States v. Olin, 927 F. Supp. 1502 (S.D. Ala. 1996), rev'd, 107 F.3d 1506, 1511-15
(11th Cir. 1997)).
260. See John J. Lyons, Deep Pockets and CERCLA: Should Superfund Li-
ability be Abolished?, 6 STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 271 (1986/1987) (arguing that shifting
the cost of environmental cleanup from the government to PRPs creates huge
transaction costs to the public's detriment).
261. See The Asset Conservation, Lender Liability, and Deposit Insurance
Protection Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(E)-(G) (1996); 42 U.S.C. §
9607(n)(1)-(8) (1998).
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A. Lender Liability Protections
As originally enacted, lender liability under CERCLA is
imposed under § 9607(a), which provides that a party that
"own[s] or operate[s]" a facility either presently or "at the
time of disposal of any hazardous substance" is potentially
responsible for response costs incurred by the government
in the cleanup of hazardous wastes resulting from the fa-
cility.262 As with other PRPs under this section, CERCLA
holds an owner or operator of a facility strictly liable for the
expenses incurred. This section does, however, exempt from
liability "secured creditors" which includes a "person, who,
without participating in the management of a... facility,
holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security
interest in the.., facility." " Known as the "secured credi-
tor exemption," much uncertainty surrounded its interpre-
tation, and the courts were left with the task of determining
Congress's intent.
This consternation was brought to bear as conflicting
court opinions arose in 1990 involving the "secured creditor
exemption" and its application to owners and operators.264
Most notably in United States v. Fleet Factors,26 the Elev-
enth Circuit held that despite the lender's "indicia of own-
ership" in the facility through a deed of trust to protect its
security interest, the lender could be found liable if it suffi-
ciently participated in the management of the facility.266
The court adopted the standard that "a secured creditor will
be liable if its involvement with the management of the fa-
cility is sufficiently broad to support the inference that it
could affect hazardous waste disposal decisions if it so
chose."27 Further, under this ruling it is not necessary for a
262. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982 & West Supp. 1998); see also supra text ac-
companying note 209.
263. Id. § 9601(20)(A)(iii).
264. See, e.g., United States v. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d 1550, 1556 (11th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991) (acknowledging that "[t]he construc-
tion of the secured creditor exemption [was] an issue of first impression" for
federal appellate courts in this case); In re Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d 668
(9th Cir. 1990).
265. 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990).
266. Id. at 1556. But see In re Bergsoe Metal Corp., 910 F.2d at 672 (declin-
ing to follow the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation of the "secured creditor ex-
emption" and finding instead that "there must be some actual management of
the facility before a secured creditor will fall outside the exemption").
267. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1558.
547
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
creditor to be an operator, or be involved in the day-to-day
operations of the facility, or even participate in manage-
ment decisions regarding the facility's hazardous waste.268
The court reasoned that this standard would encourage
creditors to monitor their debtors' hazardous waste policies
and treatment systems, and provide incentives to debtors to
improve waste problems because of the potential denial of
financial support.269
As might be expected, the Fleet Factors "capacity to in-
fluence standard" created huge disincentives for lenders to
provide financing to operations that involved hazardous
waste and made lenders reluctant to work closely with
management, not only in the area of hazardous waste deci-
sions, but also "during work-out negotiations or during for-
bearance periods."27 ° As a result, lenders sought Supreme
Court review of Fleet Factors, legislative action, or an ad-
ministrative regulation addressing their concerns.27' Subse-
quently, the Supreme Court denied review,272 and legislative
amendments were not forthcoming despite intensive lob-
bying efforts on behalf of the lending community.
In 1992, the EPA stepped up to the plate to provide a
federal regulation to counteract the Fleet Factors decision
and issued its Lender Liability Rule.273 Under the EPA's
rule, limited involvement by a lender in a debtor's opera-
tions did not subject the lender to CERCLA liability unless
the lender participated in "hazardous waste decision-
making, environmental compliance, or substantially all
day-to-day managerial control."274 The EPA's attempt to in-
clude specific parties in the secured creditor exemption,
thus protecting them from liability, was met with resistance
from the courts several years later. In Kelly v. U.S. Envi-
268. See id. at 1557-58.
269. See id. at 1558.
270. H. Edward Abelson, Environmental Risks for Lenders, in COMMERCIAL
REAL ESTATE FINANCING: WHAT BoRmowERs AND LENDERS NEED TO KNOW 1029,
1046 (Practicing Law Institute ed., 1999).
271. See William W. Buzbee, CERCLA's New Safe Harbors for Banks, Lend-
ers, and Fiduciaries, 26 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,656, 10,657 (1996).
272. See Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1550, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1046 (1991).
273. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.1100 (codifying 57 Fed. Reg. 18,344 (1992)). The
EPA issued this regulation under the National Oil and Hazardous Substances
Pollution Contingency Plan, and specifically addressed defenses available to
lenders under CERCLA. See WILLIAM L. NORTON, 6A NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW
AND PRACTICE 2D § 149:8 (1999).
274. Buzbee, supra note 271, at 10,657.
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ronmental Protection Agency,"' the District of Columbia
Circuit Court struck down the EPA's Lender Liability Rule,
finding that the EPA went beyond its statutory rulemaking
authority-specifically, it found that the EPA could not de-
fine the scope of CERCLA liability.276 Determined to con-
tinue its efforts to combat the imposition of liability on spe-
cific lenders, the EPA subsequently incorporated its
invalidated Lender Liability Rule into a non-binding policy
statement.277 Additionally, the EPA indirectly implemented
CERCLA liability protection for lenders by means of its en-
forcement discretion.278
Recognizing the importance of protecting non-
participatory lenders from liability under CERCLA and un-
derstanding the limitations of EPA's statutory ability to
prevent liability in this area, Congress reacted by promul-
gating the Asset Conservation, Lender Liability and De-
posit Insurance Protection Act of 1996 (Asset Conservation
Law).279 This law codified much of the EPA's Lender Liabil-
ity Rule, mandating that a lender with a security interest in
property must actually "participat[e] in the management or
operational affairs of the facility or vessel" before incurring
liability under CERCLA as an owner or operator.280 Seen by
some as the "first significant amendments in a decade to
275. 15 F.3d 1100 (D.C. Cir. 1994), cert. denied sub nom., American Bankers
Ass'n v. Kelly, 115 S. Ct. 900 (1995).
276. See id. at 1105-08 (concluding that under CERCLA § 107 the EPA's
role was limited to litigator and not rulemaker); see also NORTON, supra note
273, § 149:8 ("The court held that the EPA Rule was valid neither as a substan-
tive regulation, nor as a[n] interpretive regulation, and was, therefore, not to be
given deference by the courts."); Philip L. Cormella, Environmental Issues and
Liability Considerations in ACQUIRING OR SELLING THE PRIVATELY HELD
COMPANY 733, 740 (Practicing Law Institute ed., 1999).
277. See 60 Fed. Reg. 63,517 (1995). This guideline was issued jointly by the
EPA and the U.S. Department of Justice and was aimed at entities that acquire
property involuntarily. See also Cormella, supra note 276, at 740. But see Abel-
son, supra note 270, at 1047 (noting that the EPA's and Justice Department's
non-binding policy statement had "no force or effect with respect to private
party claims").
278. See Buzbee, supra note 271, at 10,658.
279. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(E)-(G) (1996). Interestingly, the Asset Conserva-
tion Law amended CERCLA with little fanfare and almost no legislative history
as it was virtually "buried" within the federal budget bill for 1997, the Omnibus
Consolidated Appropriations Act of the 104th Congress. See Buzbee, supra note
271, at 10,656.
280. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(E).
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the much-debated [CERCLA]," 28' the Asset Conservation
Law ended the consternation which arose from the Fleet
Factors decision. No longer could the mere "capacity to in-
fluence" management decisions bring an end to the applica-
bility of the secured creditor exemption under CERCLA for
a lender. Additionally, by its broad definition of "lender,"
the law applied to a large class of lenders including institu-
tional, private, and "involuntary government holders of con-
taminated properties.""2 Previously unprotected under
CERCLA,.8 the Asset Conservation Law now provided spe-
cific liability protections for fiduciaries.2 4 Overall, the strict
liability application of CERCLA to lenders was effectively
lessened under the statutory protections afforded by the
Asset Conservation Law.28 This development has been
strengthened by subsequent court decisions conforming to
the intent and language of the Asset Conservation Law,
finding no lender liability without management participa-
tion.2"
B. CERCLA Case Law Developments
Aside from these developments in the area of lender li-
ability, a notable progression of change in CERCLA liability
occurred in case law following the decades after the stat-
ute's enactment. During the first decade, 1981 through
281. Buzbee, supra note 271, at 10,656.
282. Id. at 10,663.
283. See, e.g., City of Phoenix v. Garbage Servs. Co., 816 F. Supp. 564, 567
(D. Ariz. 1993).
284. See Abelson, supra note 270, at 1052. Subject to statutory and common
law exceptions, the Asset Conservation Law limits the liability of a fiduciary for
a facility owned in a fiduciary capacity to assets held in that fiduciary capacity.
285. See, e.g., Buzbee, supra note 271, at 10,663 (concluding that the Asset
Conservation Act provides "broad new statutory protection from CERCLA li-
abilities" to "lenders, fiduciaries, and involuntary government holders of con-
taminated property").
286. See, e.g., Canadyne-Georgia Corp. v. NationsBank, N.A., 183 F.3d 1269
(11th Cir. 1999); East Bay Mun. Utility Dist. v. United States Dept. of Com-
merce, 142 F.3d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Kelley v. Tiscornia, 104 F.3d 361 (6th Cir.
1996) (unpublished table disposition); F.P. Woll & Co. v. Fifth & Mitchell St.
Corp., No. 96-5973, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11685 (E.D. Pa. 1997); Stearns &
Foster Bedding Co. v. Franklin Holding Corp., 947 F. Supp. 790 (D. N.J. 1996).
See generally United States v. Pesses, No. 90-0654, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7902
(W.D. Pa. 1998) (exempting a savings and loan from CERCLA liability because
it did not participate in management decisions and only held title to the facility
for loan security purposes).
550 [Vol. 48
CERCLA RETROACTIVE LIABILITY
1991, Superfund litigation was rampant and the "expansion
of the scope of liability.., continued unabated."217 In fact,
there was an increased willingness to find state, federal,
and municipal governments liable under CERCLA, not only
for costs associated with hazardous site contamination, but
also for their actions involving cleanup efforts.288 The courts
reached harsh results in their adjudication of CERCLA li-
ability, finding support for these decisions in their interpre-
tation of Congress's express language and intent.2 9 This led
to uniformity and consistency when it came to certain
CERCLA liability questions.290
Enter decade two-the emphasis on case law evolved
from an expansive application of "who will be liable" to a fo-
cus on accountability for the cleanup costs incurred. We be-
gan to see "attempts to bootstrap [the EPA's and Justice
Department's] interpretations of [CERCLA]" in specific ar-
eas such as landowner liability, security interest, and cor-
porate / subsidiary liability."' For example, in Westwood
Pharmaceuticals v. National Fuel Gas Distribution Corp.292
the Second Circuit recognized that a former owner of prop-
erty who exercised due care in the handling of hazardous
waste could assert an "innocent seller defense"2 93 against
the subsequent buyer of the property. The court reasoned
287. Kyle E. McSlarrow et al., A Decade of Superfund Litigation: CERCLA
Caselaw From 1981-1991, 21 ENvTL. L. REP. 10,367, 10,367 (1991).
288. See id. at 10,368 (citing United States v. Hardage, 985 F.2d 1427 (10th
Cir. 1993). See generally United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 17 ENVTL. L. REP. 21,085
(E.D. Pa. 1986) (finding that sovereign immunity was not a bar to a counter-
claim for recovery costs against the EPA); United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc.,
630 F. Supp. 1361 (D. N.H. 1985).
289. See supra notes 158-68 and accompanying text.
290. See Lewis M. Barr, CERCLA Made Simple: An Analysis of the Cases
under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act of 1980, 45 Bus. LAW. 923, 1000 (1990). Congress's reauthorization of the
Superfund in 1990 without any changes to the original law further enhanced
the courts' ability to find consistent results. See, e.g., McSlarrow et al., supra
note 287, at 10,367 (predicting a period of stability after the reauthorization of
CERCLA because of the foreseeable continuation of CERCLA statutory and
administrative programs in effect).
291. Alfred R. Light, CERCLA Developments During 1990 of Interest to In-
surance Counsel, in POLLUTION LIABILITY MANAGING THE CHALLENGES OF
COVERAGE AND DEFENSE IN 1991, Q205 ALI-ABA 39, 41 (1991) (video class tran-
script live via satellite to 60+ cities on January 17, 1991).
292. 964 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992).
293. Id. at 91. This defense was basically an extension of the "innocent pur-
chaser defense," promulgated by Congress in 1986, to the other side of the pur-
chase equation. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(b)(3), 9601(35)(A)-(B) (1986).
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that such a defense is allowable where a seller discloses the
existence of the hazardous substances to the new owner
who subsequently experiences an unforeseeable release of
the contaminants on the property.94
A further demonstration of the judicial "tailoring" of the
application of CERCLA liability exists in the area of re-
sponse costs and PRPs. A growing number of cases began
focusing on fault and causation as criteria for determining
apportionment of CERCLA liability.295 For example, in
United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp.,296 the Third Circuit
held that the lower court erred in its determination that a
PRP was jointly and severally liable for cleanup costs at a
Superfund site where its wastes were commingled with oth-
ers' waste.297 Here the United States sued twenty defen-
dants for response costs it incurred in the cleanup of haz-
ardous substances released into the Susquehanna River,
holding Alcan liable for the difference between the govern-
ment's cleanup costs and the amounts received from the de-
fendants who had settled.29" The court found that Alcan
should be "permitted [the] opportunity to limit or avoid li-
ability."299 Specifically, the court ruled that Alcan could at-
tempt to demonstrate that the harm was "divisible" and ca-
pable of reasonable apportionment among the PRPs, and, if
successful, Alcan "should only be liable for that portion of
the harm fairly attributable to it.""'9 Importantly, the court
recognized that a PRP should be provided with the oppor-
tunity to show that its wastes did not cause the resulting
environmental harm, despite a commingling with other
wastes at a Superfund site. Apportionment of liability was
no longer reserved for private party resolution through con-
294. See Westwood Pharm., 964 F.2d at 91. The new property owner's con-
struction activities led to the release of the hazardous substances in this in-
stance. See id. at 87.
295. See, e.g., Environmental Transp. Sys., Inc. v. ENSCO, Inc., 969 F.2d
503 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 932 F.2d 568 (6th Cir.
1991); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Koppers Co., 771 F. Supp. 1420 (D. Md. 1991).
296. 964 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1992).
297. The Third Circuit vacated and remanded the lower court's determina-
tion. See id. at 255, 271.
298. See id. at 257.
299. Id. at 269.
300. See id. at 269-70 (emphasis added). The court, however, recognized that
Alcan's burden in proving the divisibility of harm to this Superfund site was
"substantial" and "factually complex" since it involved findings of "relative tox-
icity, migratory potential and synergistic capacity." Id. at 269.
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tribution actions."0 '
Most recently, in United States v. Bestfoods,"2 the Su-
preme Court defined corporate parent liability under
CERCLA, reversing a trend of expansive corporate liability
that seemingly swallowed traditional corporate law doc-
trines. Now mere corporate relationship is not enough to
find direct liability of a parent corporation under
CERCLA-a parent must have actively participated in, and
exercised control over, the operations of a polluting subsidi-
ary.0 3 The issue to be addressed after Bestfoods is whether
the agents of the parent corporation managed or conducted
operations "related to pollution.., or decisions about com-
pliance with environmental regulations," rendering the
parent subject to CERCLA's reach.0 4
C. CERCLA Administrative Law Developments
Coinciding with the evolvement of CERCLA case law
was a similar moderation of liability under EPA regulations
and policies pertaining to CERCLA. Except for its early
administrative years, which were plagued with scandal and
criticism for failure to effectively deal with the hazardous
waste problem,0 5 the EPA became synonymous with expan-
sive CERCLA enforcement activities. These activities were
eventually tempered with EPA guidance policies such as
301. Under CERCLA's contribution provision, a person who incurs response
costs or who is required to reimburse the government for response costs may
seek appropriate contribution from other responsible parties. See 42 U.S.C. §
9613(f)(1) (1996).
302. 524 U.S. 51 (1998).
303. See id. at 55; see also id. at 66-67 (defining an operator under CERCLA
as one who manages, directs, or conducts operations specifically related to pol-
lution). The Court also held that a corporate parent may be found derivatively
liable only if the "corporate veil may be pierced" through an application of com-
mon law and corporate law principles. See id. at 55. Further, there is "nothing
in CERCLA [that] purports to reject this bedrock principle" of corporate law. Id.
at 62.
304. Id. at 66-67.
305. See generally JONATHAN LASH ET AL., A SEASON OF SPOILS (1984). This
author found that the EPA's actions to cleanup hazardous wastes were steeped
in bureaucracy and politics during the Reagan era. For example, a congres-
sional investigation uncovered improprieties by EPA official Rita Lavelle, along
with attempts to impede cleanups at hazardous waste cites, which eventually




"Prospective Purchaser Agreements,""6 issued in 1989,
which prevented CERCLA liability in certain instances.
Under this guidance, the EPA would consider providing
prospective purchasers of contaminated property with cove-
nants not to sue under CERCLA.3 °7 The purpose of the Pro-
spective Purchaser Agreements was to combat the creation
of "negative" property values that resulted when CERCLA
response costs were greater than the value of the property,
thereby preventing the abandonment of contaminated
sites.0 In effect, buyers of contaminated property would not
inherit unknown liability under CERCLA as "owners."
Acknowledging that the Superfund Program was "bro-
ken,"3 9 in 1993 EPA Administrator Carol Browner took a
substantial step towards tempering the effects of CERCLA
by implementing the first of three rounds of Superfund re-
forms. 10 The first round of the "Superfund Administrative
Improvements" involved continuing initiatives "designed to
improve the overall efficiency, effectiveness, and fairness of
the Superfund Program." 1 ' For example, in pursuit of in-
creasing liability fairness, by the close of round one in 1994,
the EPA had removed over 5,500 small volume PRPs from
306. EPA Guidance on Landowner Liability Under § 107(a)(1) of CERCLA,
De Minimis Settlements Under § 122(g)(1)(B) of CERCLA, and Settlements
with Prospective Purchasers of Contaminated Property, 54 Fed. Reg. 34,235
(1989).
307. See id. Under a Prospective Purchaser Agreement, in exchange for the
EPA's agreement not to pursue recovery of future Superfund costs from a pur-
chaser of a Superfund site, the purchaser agrees to perform or pay for a speci-
fied portion of future site remedy. See SUPERFUND REDEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE,
UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, GUIDANCE AND POLICY
(1999).
308. See Howard M. Shanker & Laurent R. Hourcl, Prospective Purchaser
Agreements, 25 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,035, 10,035 (1995).
309. Hon. Carol M. Browner, Administrator, Environmental Protection
Agency, Testimony before the House Transportation and Infrastructure Com-
mittee, Subcommittee on Water Resources and Environment, in Summary of
the March 12, 1997, Hearing by the House Transportation and Infrastructure
Committee, Subcommittee on Water Resources and Environment: Superfund
Reauthorization, UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY MAR. 12
1997, http://www.epa.gov/superfumd/new/congress/summ0312.htm (visited Jan.
7, 2000) (on file with the Buffalo Law Review) [hereinafter March 12, 1997
Hearing].
310. These reforms grew out of a 1989 "90-Day Study" and a 1991 "30-Day
Task Force" conducted by the EPA. See UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, SUPERFUND REFORMS: ANNUAL REPORT FY 1998 1 (1999)
[hereinafter Annual Report FY 19981.
311. Id. (emphasis added).
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CERCLA's liability system.312 A second round of reforms
was introduced in February 1995 containing many of the
sameprinciples manifested in the Superfund Reform Act of
1994." The EPA sought to administratively test and im-
plement the innovations from the 1994 Act with pilot proj-
ects. " The twelve initiatives involved in this round are
aimed at, among other things, "enforcement, economic re-
development, community involvement,... [and] environ-
mental justice."315 Accomplishments of round two encompass
"fostering expedited settlements [and] implementing
Brownfields initiatives."316 Finally, a third round of reforms
followed in October 1995, which advanced twenty "common
sense" initiatives intended to "promote cost-effective
cleanup choices, reduce litigation and transaction costs, and
ensure that states and communities are informed and in-
volved in cleanup decisions."'
An example of a "common sense" effort to reduce litiga-
tion and increase fairness in CERCLA's enforcement pro-
gram exists in the EPA's 1997 "Orphan Share Policy,"1 8
which expands an earlier policy allowing a PRP to avoid or
minimize its potential orphan share liability. 9 Under the
Orphan Share Policy, the EPA "forgives" a portion of a
PRP's financial responsibility by allowing the PRP to per-
312. See UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, SUPERFUND
REFORM: SCORECARD OF FIRsT ROUND, EPA PUB. No. 540-R-94-069 (1993) (de-
scribing the Round 1 Initiatives and progress made between June 23, 1993, and
September 30, 1994) (accessed via the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
Web Site, http//:www.epa.gov/superfimd/programs/reforms/docs.htm).
313. See Annual Report FY 1998, supra note 310, at 39-46.
314. See id.
315. Id.
316. Id. The EPA defines a "brownfield" as "a site, or portion thereof, that
has actual or perceived contamination and an active potential for redevelop-
ment or reuse." See OUTREACH AND SPECIAL PROJECTS STAFF, COMMUNITY
REINVESTMENT ACT (CRA) FACT SHEET, EPA PUB. No. 500-F-97-100 (1997) (ac-
cessed via the Web site of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
http:www.epa.gov/superfund/programs/reforms/docs.htm).
317. See Annual Report FY 1998, supra note 310, at 1.
318. 62 Fed. Reg. 61,113 (1997) (addendum to the EPA's 1984 "Interim
CERCLA Settlement Policy").
319. An orphan share is the portion of CERCLA financial responsibility as-
signed to a PRP who is insolvent or defunct. Under CERCLA's joint and several
liability system, at sites where there are parties who have no money to contrib-
ute to the cleanup, viable PRPs are required to absorb these orphan shares. See
Stephanie Pullen Brown et al., Recent Developments in Environmental Law, 30
URB. LAW. 945, 979 (1998).
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form work, or pay a settlement.20 The EPA will now con-
sider the inequity involved when substantial orphan shares
have to be absorbed by other PRPs.32' Additionally, in 1998,
the EPA published its final "Policy for Municipality and
Municipal Solid Waste: CERCLA Settlements at NPL Co-
Disposal Sites" (MSW Policy). 2 The MSW Policy aids in
resolution of the liability of generators and transporters of
municipal waste by setting specific formulas for calculating
costs for settlements based on actual quantities of munici-
pal waste they contributed to the site." As a result of this
policy, a PRP is enabled to "resolve its liability to the EPA
and, thereby, obtain statutory protection from private party
contribution actions under CERCLA."24
Despite the accomplishments of the EPA's forty-five re-
form initiatives, and its commitment to improving the Su-
perfund Program, the administration has acknowledged it
cannot do it alone."2 5 Administrator Browner has called for
Congress to enact new Superfund legislation that includes a
"liability structure that makes sense."326
D. CERCLA Legislative Developments
For decades, Congress has struggled in its efforts to
reauthorize and reform CERCLA, a process that has been
characterized as a "drawn out, acrimonious political
320. However, the EPA limits the compensation amount to "25 percent of
either the response costs or the total past and future oversight costs, whichever
is less." UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, SUPERFUND
REFORMS: REFORM 3-11 ORPHAN SHARE COMPENSATION (1999) (accessed via the
Web site of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency,
http//:www.epa.gov/superfund/programs/reforms/reforms/3-11.htm) [hereinafter
Reform 3-11].
321. See Pullen Brown et al., supra note 319, at 979; see also Reform 3-11,
supra note 320.
322. 63 Fed. Reg. 8,197 (1998).
323. Industry groups have unsuccessfully challenged the equity and validity
of this policy in court actions, arguing among other things that preferential
treatment is given to municipal waste parties under this policy. See, e.g.,
Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 26 F. Supp.2d 180 (D.D.C. 1998) (granting the
EPA's motion to dismiss and holding that the EPA's MSW Policy was not a "fi-
nal agency action" subject to judicial review under the Administrative Proce-
dure Act).
324. Pullen Brown et al., supra note 319, at 977.
325. See March 12, 1997 Hearing, supra note 309.
326. Id.
[Vol. 48556
2000] CERCLA RETROACTIVE LIABILITY 557
brawl."27 Despite some isolated endeavors to reshape
CERCLA liability through specific legislation, attempts at
passage of a reform bill have failed. Among the legislation
that has been enacted to remedy CERCLA problems is the
previously discussed Asset Conservation Law, 28 and the
"innocent purchaser defense" promulgated in 1986.29 The
innocent purchaser defense relieves an owner or operator,
who acquires a facility after hazardous substances were
disposed of at the facility, from liability if certain criteria
are met.3 ' Among other things, the party must show that
the release of hazardous substances was caused solely by an
act or omission of a third party, other than "one whose act
or omission occurs in connection with a contractual rela-
tionship... with the defendant," and the owner or operator
must have taken "due care" with regard to the hazardous
substances.33'
Since enactment of a comprehensive reform of CERCLA
has been elusive, continuation of the Superfumd Program
has been accomplished via a back door approach of extend-
327. See, e.g., Rena I. Steinzor & David Kolker, To Pay or Not to Pay: Local
Government's Stake in Legislation to Reauthorize Superfund, 25 URB. LAW. 627,
628-29 (1993) (explaining that the last reauthorization of the Superfund, SARA,
"took four-and-a-half years to complete and involved a bruising battle between
environmentalists, industry, and the Reagan Administration"); see also Super-
fund Reauthorization: Comm. on Env't & Pub. Works Markup of S.8, The Super-
fund Cleanup Acceleration Act of 1998, 106th Cong., 1998 WL 159104 [hereinaf-
ter S 8 Reauthorization] (statement of John H. Chafee, Chairman, Comm. on
Env't & Pub. Works explaining that the Superfund reauthorization process be-
gan in the 101st Congress).
328. See supra notes 279-86 and accompanying text.
329. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(b)(3), 9601(35)(A)-(B) (1986).
330. See id.
331. Id. § 9607(b)(3). "Contractual relationship" is defined to include "in-
struments transferring title or possession, unless the real property on which the
facility concerned is located was acquired by the defendant after the disposal or
placement of the hazardous substance on, in, or at the facility." Additionally the
defendant must meet one of three conditions:
(i) At the time the defendant acquired the facility the defendant did not
know and had no reason to know that any hazardous substance which is
the subject of the release or threatened release was disposed of on, in, or
at the facility. (ii) The defendant is a government entity which acquired
the facility by escheat, or through any other involuntary transfer or ac-
quisition, or through the exercise of eminent domain authority by pur-
chase or condemnation. (iii) The defendant acquired the facility by in-
heritance or bequest.
Id. § 9601(35)(A).
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ing program financing.2 This methodology has, of course,
effected no substantive changes to the law. Neither has un-
successful head-on attacks initiated in the 103d and 104th
Congresses calling for a full repeal of CERCLA's retroactive
liability. 3 Strong partisan opposition over this issue has
led to a more "pragmatic approach," with subsequent bills
backing-off this demand for elimination of retroactive li-
ability, and focusing instead on the revision of the key li-
ability sections.334 For example, the "Superfund Cleanup Ac-
celeration Act of 1997" (S.8)35 , introduced in the Senate
exempted from liability for activities pre-January 1, 1997,
all co-disposal landfill generators, arrangers, and trans-
porters, or those Congress views as the "little guys" of Su-
perfund litigation.36 Additionally, CERCLA's joint and sev-
eral liability scheme would be replaced with a mandatory
fair-share allocation system at multi-party sites, and states
would be provided with an opportunity for a greater role in
federal site remediation.33 7 "The Superfund Reform Act" in-
troduced in the House in 1997 (H.R. 3000)338 to amend
CERCLA, similarly restricted retroactive liability. This bill
332. See Steinzor & Kolker, supra note 327, at 629 (discussing the furtive
attachment in 1990 of a five year extension of Superfund Program funding to
other legislation); see also Allan Freedman, With Bipartisan Deal Elusive, Su-
perfund Effort Dies, 54 CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 2044, 2044 (1996) (noting that de-
spite the expiration of taxes December 31, 1995, a surplus for funding environ-
mental cleanup through the year 2000 exists).
333. See Kubasek et al., supra note 183, at 222 (discussing Ohio Republican
Michael G. Oxley's proposal in the House, H.R. 2500, "Reform of Superfund Act
of 1995," and New Hampshire Republican Senator Robert C. Smith's proposal in
the Senate, S.1285, "The Accelerated Cleanup and Environmental Restoration
Act of 1995"); Taylor, supra note 127, at 80, 81.
334. See Taylor, supra note 127, at 81; Christopher J. Dunsky, Let's All
March Up the Hill and Down Again: Congress Considers Superfund Reform, 1
MICH. ENVTL. COMPLIANCE UPDATE 9 (1997) (stating that a new Republican bill,
S.8, approaches the "political center" because it exempts or limits liability of
certain PRPs rather than eliminating pre-1980 enactment liability as earlier
CERCLA proposals did). Cf Kubasek et al., supra note 183, at 222 (explaining
that while the reauthorization debates in Congress "do not focus exclusively on
the issue of retroactivity under the Act, ... the issue of retroactivity is consid-
ered one of the divisive 'linchpins' of the program").
335. S.8, 105th Cong. (1997).
336. See id. (providing exemptions to liability under "Title II: Liability"); see
also id. § 501 (detailing "Liability Exceptions and Limitations"); Taylor, supra
note 127, at 81-82 (citing Recent Developments in the Congress, 27 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10,128 (1997)).
337. See S.8, 105th Cong. (1997); Taylor, supra note 127, at 82.
338. H.R. 3000, 105th Cong. § 201(a) (1997).
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exempted three major classes of parties from cleanup li-
ability: (1) generators and transporters whose waste did not
significantly contribute to the cleanup costs, (2) generators
and transporters of only municipal solid waste at an NPL
site, and (3) generators and transporters of de minimis
amounts of waste at an NPL site.33 9 H.R. 3000 also absolved
certain owners and operators who acquired a facility by in-
heritance or bequest from liability, and limited liability for
tax-exempt organizations and municipalities.34 ° There has
been a virtual onslaught of bills targeting Superfund reform
and/or authorization over the years. "4 In addition to S.8 and
H.R. 3000, CERCLA legislation currently under considera-
tion in the 106th Congress that would effectively lessen the
Act's retroactive liability includes:
" H.R. 375, "Superfund Liability Exemption for Local
Education Agencies Act,"3 42 to amend CERCLA and
absolve certain educational agencies from liability.
" H.R. 1300, "Recycle America's Land Act of 1999,"343 to
provide liability relief for innocent landowners and
small businesses, and promote brownfields redevel-
opment.34
" H.R. 2247, "Small Business Superfund Fairness
Act,"3 45 to amend CERCLA to absolve certain small
business entities from liability for response costs at
NPL sites.
" H.R. 2940, "Common Sense Superfund Liability Relief
Act of 1999,"  to absolve owners, operators, or les-
sees of residential property, small businesses, small
nonprofit organizations, and prospective purchasers
of liability under certain conditions.
" H.R. 2956, "Children's Protection and Community
Cleanup Act of 1999,"347 to reauthorize CERCLA,
protect children from hazardous wastes, ensure
339. See id. § 201(a); see also Superfund Reauthorization Issues in the 106th
Congress, Cong. Res. Serv. 5-6 (Dec. 13, 1999) (David K. Aylward, President,
Nat'l Strategies, Inc.) [hereinafter Superfund Reauthorization Issues].
340. See H.R. 3000, 105th Cong. § 201 (1997).
341. A minimum of 15 bills to amend CERCLA were introduced in the 105th
Congress alone. See Kubasek et al., supra note 183, at 227 & n.183.
342. H.R. 375, 106th Cong. (1999).
343. H.R. 1300, 106th Cong. (1999).
344. See id. §§ 302, 305.
345. H.R. 2247, 106th Cong. (1999).
346. H.R. 2940, 106th Cong. (1999).
347. H.R. 2956, 106th Cong. (1999).
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cleanup of Superfund sites in economically dis-
tressed communities, and limit liability for natural
resource damages.3 4' This bill would also amend
CERCLA to absolve prospective purchasers and in-
nocent landowners from liability."9
* S. 1090 "Superfund Program Completion Act of
1999," l ' which includes a "Fair Share Liability Allo-
cations and Protections" provision, exempting cer-
tain homeowners, small businesses, and small non-
profit organizations from liability, and "safe
harbors" for innocent landholders.35'
* S. 1105, "Superfund Litigation Reduction and Brown-
field Cleanup Act of 1999,"352 to assist local govern-
ments and states in assessing and remediating
brownfields sites, and increase fairness and reduce
litigation. This bill includes liability exemptions for
small business and brownfields liability relief.353
" S. 1528, "Superfund Recycling Equity Act of 1999,"3
to amend CERCLA and absolve certain persons in-
volved in recycling transactions from liability.
O S. 1537, "Superfumd Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1999,""'5 which contains li-
ability exemptions for small business and liability
limitations for municipalities, "religious, charitable,
scientific, and educational organizations."5
All of these bills were referred to congressional commit-
tees during 1999. The most promising piece of legislation
appears to be H.R. 1300, which has 145 cosponsors and was
approved by the House Transportation and Infrastructure
Committee on September 30, 1999, as amended. Represen-
tative Jack Quinn, a New York Republican who supports
this bill, states that "H.R. 1300 acknowledges the impor-
tance of brownfield cleanup and use, and addresses the
broader concern of the inadequacies of Superfund legisla-
348. See id. §§ 401, 501, 702.
349. See id. §§ 622, 623.
350. S. 1090, 106th Cong. (1999).
351. Id. §§ 104, 301-303.
352. S. 1105, 106th Cong. (1999).
353. See id. §§ 101-103, 201.
354. S. 1528, 106th Cong. (1999).
355. S. 1537, 106th Cong. (1999).
356. See id. §§ 301, 304.
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tion."357 For these reasons, he purports that of all the pend-




Critics and environmentalists have questioned the suc-
cess of the Superfind program since its inception in 1980,
pointing to the 1,221 sites remaining on the Superfund Na-
tional Priorities List (NPL).359 This list of sites, identified by
the EPA for remediation, are the hazardous waste sites that
"pos[e] the greatest threat to the public's health and the en-
vironment."' Remedial action for each NPL site requires
six to ten years to complete and costs on average $25 mil-
lion per site.3 ' One study found that through fiscal year
1997, greater than $32 billion had been expended to
cleanup only thirty seven percent of NPL sites, or 497
sites."' Additionally, an estimated forty thousand hazard-
ous waste sites had been reported to various federal agen-
cies to date. 3 The cost of clean up for all Superfund waste
sites nationally is estimated to total over $100 billion.6
Despite the negative statistics, proponents argue that
the Superfund Program has affected stabilization of con-
357. Statement from Congressman Jack Quinn to author (Feb. 28, 2000) (on
file with the Buffalo Law Review).
358. Id.
359. See Superfund Reauthorization Issues, supra note 339, at 5-6 (finding
only 201 sites have been deleted from the NPL after 19 years). But see Thomas
S. Udall, Superfund: The Keynote Address at the 20th Annual Advanced Ameri-
can Law Institute-American Bar Association Course of Study on Hazardous
Wastes, Superfund, and Toxic Substances, 29 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,143 (1999) (dis-
cussing the success of the Superfund Program in cleaning up hazardous waste
sites).
360. Barry L. Johnson & Christopher T. DeRosa, The Toxicologic Hazard of
Superfund Hazardous Waste Sites, in 12 REVIEWS ON ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH
235, 236 (1997).
361. See OFFICE OF EMERGENCY AND REMEDIAL RESPONSE, UNITED STATE
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, VOL. 1, No. 2, DESCRIPTIONS OF 11
PROPOSED SITES AND 17 FINAL SITES ADDED TO THE NATIONAL PRIORITIES LIST IN
JAN. 1999, 2 (1999); see also Palisano, supra note 175, at 405 & n.22.
362. See Superfund Reauthorization Issues, supra note 339. This total
amount includes both public and private moneys. See id.
363. See Johnson & DeRosa, supra note 355, at 235.
364. See Martin A. McCrory, The Equitable Solution to Superfund Liability:
Creating a Viable Allocation Procedure for Business at Superfund Sites, 23 VT.
L. REV. 59, 59 & n.5 (1998).
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taminated waste sites and reduction of public health
risks.365 Additionally, the Act has resulted in a significant
reduction in the amount of hazardous waste generated by
industry, encouraged recycling and voluntary cleanup of
contaminated sites by companies, and "spawned a hugely
successful and innovative environmental cleanup indus-
try."366 Supporters maintain that a repeal of the Act's retro-
active liability would reportedly cost the federal govern-
ment from $800 million to $1.3 billion per year, an amount
that would have to be unfairly borne by the taxpayers in-
stead of the parties the Act finds responsible for creating
the hazardous waste sites.3 6' They further claim that by its
nature, CERCLA promotes such cost internalization since it
emphasizes past profits as justification for current liability,
and its liability scheme has been interpreted by the courts
as an avoidance of a direct tax on the general public.
3 68
365. See Udall, supra note 359, at 3.
More than 4,800 removal actions have been completed at both NPL and
non-NPL sites to remove drums, remove contaminated soil and debris,
drain pits and lagoons filled with hazardous liquids and sludges, etc...
All construction activity has been completed at 509 NPL sites, and op-
eration and maintenance is now underway. . . Construction of the rem-
edy has been partially completed at another 480 sites.
Id. Udall also explains that the low number of remedial completions for NPL
sites is misleading because nearly 85% of the NPL sites involve groundwater
contamination which typically requires decades to achieve purification. See id.
(citing NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ALTERNATIVES FOR GROUND WATER CLEANUP
104 (1994)).
366. Udall, supra note 359, at 3.
367. See Kubasek et al., supra note 183, at 229 & n.199 (noting the tax bur-
den under CERCLA's current liability scheme predominantly falls on chemical
and petroleum companies); cf Rena I. Steinzor, The Reauthorization of Super-
fund. The Public Works Alternative, 25 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,078 (1995) (arguing
that the repeal of Superfund's retroactive liability system and replacement with
an expanded public works cleanup program would have necessitated major new
taxes and resulted in increased litigation). But see John J. Lyons, Deep Pockets
and CERCLA Should Superfund Liability Be Abolished? 6 STAN ENVTL. L. J.
271, 271-74 (1986/1987) (arguing that CERCLA should be funded exclusively by
a taxation system because CERCLA's imposition of liability on PRPs creates
huge transaction and impedes site cleanup); Exception for Federal Facilities
Sought in Call to Eliminate Retroactive Liability, 25 Env't Rep. (BNA) at 1870
(1995) (discussing Senator Robert C. Smith's and Representative Michael B.
Oxley's contention that an elimination of retroactive liability is not likely to
cause an increase in taxes because tax breaks as incentives could offset the loss
of revenue).
368. See, e.g., Smith Land Improvement Corp. v. Celotex Corp., 851 F.2d 86
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1029 (1988) (holding a successor corporation li-
able under CERCLA). The Smith court reasoned that:
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CONCLUSION
In the aftermath of the Eastern Enterprises decision, it
is tempting to extrapolate a result overturning laws such as
CERCLA that impose harsh retroactive liability. The real-
ity, however, is that there can be no expectation of a
sweeping change in the outcome of Fifth Amendment con-
stitutional challenges to CERCLA's retroactive liability due
to the Eastern Enterprises decision. Eastern Enterprises will
govern a challenge to retroactive legislation only if the spe-
cific parameters set forth by the Court can be established;
clearly, the law under scrutiny must impose a severely ret-
roactive and disproportionate effect upon a claimant to en-
able a challenge to be successful. Complicating matters is
the fact that Eastern's Coal Act challenge was viewed by
the plurality as an extreme situation applying to a specific
claimant. The amount of support the Supreme Court's
holding in Eastern Enterprises may lend to a challenge to
CERCLA's constitutionality is further diluted by the
Court's severely split decision, i.e., a majority of the Court
disagreed with the plurality's Takings Clause analysis.
Subsequent to the Eastern Enterprises decision, there is
certainly no defined rule governing a claim that challenges
the constitutionality of a law imposing retroactive liability.
Arguably, the same fact pattern present in Eastern En-
terprises also exists in many CERCLA challenges; a dispro-
portionate, severe and extremely retroactive liability is im-
posed upon the claimant. The distinguishing factor is the
statute involved in each. Because the nature and extent of
altered expectation interests must be assessed in each case,
the distinctions between the two Acts will effectively serve
to diminish any support the Eastern Enterprises decision
may provide to a CERCLA challenge. Indeed, to date,
CERCLA challenges based on Eastern Enterprises have not
fared well. The courts continue to demonstrate their un-
willingness to find CERCLA legislation unlawful. They
have found a retrospective intent behind CERCLA despite a
scant legislative history and absolutely no express language
Expenses can be borne by two sources: the entities which had a specific
role in the production.., of the hazardous condition, or the taxpayers
through federal funds. CERCLA leaves no doubt that Congress intended
the burden to fall on the latter only when the responsible parties lacked




in the statute promulgating retroactive application. Fur-
ther, the judiciary has been influenced by societal pressures
to solve the overwhelming hazardous waste pollution prob-
lem. These pressures result in a comparatively lessened
scrutiny by the courts of the harsh retroactive liability im-
posed by CERCLA.
For these reasons, the courts will most likely continue
to apply the Eastern Enterprises decision very narrowly,
and its effect on future challenges to CERCLA legislation
will be minimal. Instead, temperance of CERCLA's strin-
gent liability scheme will continue to be realized through
the interactive dynamics of judicial, administrative, and
legislative influences. In this manner an imperfect liability
scheme has become more tolerable. Yet, there is still a need
to rectify the inequities imposed under CERCLA's vast li-
ability net. However far the pendulum will swing towards a
'kinder, gentler' CERCLA liability application, it is highly
unlikely this "molding" over time will ever result in the ex-
treme of complete invalidation of the Act's retroactive li-
ability. The positive results cited by some, as well as the
overwhelming support for a system that demands that the
private sector pay, lend support to continuation of
CERCLA's basic retroactive liability scheme.
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